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Abstract
An Economic Theory of Pro-Government Militias
by
Santiago Sosa
Throughout the world, states delegate various and sundry security tasks to armed groups
outside their regular forces. The main arguments in the literature are that governments
use militias because of their logistic advantages (autonomy, informational advantages, and
cheap deployment) and to provide the government with plausible deniability for human rights
violations. However, not all militias victimize civilians and when they do the government
usually does as well. Why, then, would states use militias at all? Moreover, why, despite the
risks of side-switching, agency loss, and excessive use of force inherent to them, do states
use armed groups outside their regular forces rather than spending more on the latter? This
study develops a general framework to analyze the use of militias. It presents a formal model
of the state’s decision to spend on regular and irregular forces as if it was a firm producing
a good: security. However, these forces also produce liabilities to the state, and so it is in
balancing security and liability that the state optimizes its expenditures. The theory leads
us to expect that militias are more likely to be used, all else equal, the greater the budget
available is, the more cost-e↵ective they are relative to the regular forces, the lower the
risk of using them, and the more a state values security over liability. Likewise, there is
substitutability between armed forces: that to spend on one force the state must necessarily
spend less on the other one. Thus, all else equal, the more a state uses militias, the less it will
use its regular forces, and vice-versa. I test some of these expectations with two studies. The
first uses cross-national data on militias, judicial independence and civil wars between 1981
and 2007. I find that militias are more likely to be used in states that have a weak judiciary.
The second is a case-study of Colombia’s most recent civil war. Using municipality-level
data between 2000 and 2006, I find that the Colombian armed forces decreased their activity
against rebels in areas where the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia were active.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Why do states use militias? From tribal militias used by the United States and Iraq to fight
ISIS to a small counter-insurgency army in Colombia, a death squad in search of Basque
separatists in Spain (and France), and a coup-proofing militia that protects the Iranian
regime (the Iranian Revolutionary Guard), governments in all types of countries have made
use of armed groups outside of their regular forces to accomplish various and sundry security
tasks. Indeed, governments rarely fight rebels alone (Jentzsch, Kalyvas and Schubiger, 2015):
Militias have been present in most civil wars around the world in the latter part of the
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.
As Kalyvas and Arjona (2005) put it, to preserve the monopoly of violence, the state
must paradoxically dissolve it. Far from the Weberian monopoly of violence, what we see
throughout the world, then, is an oligopoly of violence (Carey and Mitchell, 2017). However,
the use of militias also comes at a high risk regarding the safety of their own citizens, its
institutional integrity and even the very sovereignty that militias are supposed to safeguard.
Militias may shirk their responsibilities (Carey and Mitchell, 2016) or even turn against the
state (Otto, 2015, 2018), they erode democratic institutions (Mazzei, 2009; Raleigh, 2016),
and violate human rights (Mitchell, Carey and Butler, 2014; Carey and Mitchell, 2017).
The main argument in the literature is that states use militias because they have several
advantages over the regular forces: they are cheap to deploy and their autonomy makes them
flexible and quick to react (Bo¨hmelt and Clayton, 2018), they have privileged information,
which allows them to better navigate the local population and geography, and confer some
legitimacy to the regime (Carey and Mitchell, 2016), and they provide plausible deniability
for human rights violations (Mitchell, Carey and Butler, 2014). Indeed, much of the literature
has focused on the ‘delegation of atrocities’ aspect of militias: that they are employed because
they do the ‘dirty work’ so that the government does not take the blame.
However, as Stanton (2015) shows, not all militias target civilians and when they do
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3the government usually does as well. In the latter case, it would seem di cult to argue
that political cover is the condition sine qua non for the use of militias. This argument
must therefore be made more nuanced. Moreover, going back to the advantages mentioned
above, the literature fails to address under what circumstances these would make militia
use desirable given how risky their use is, nor why it wouldn’t be preferable to spend more
on the regular forces rather than rely on agents. In other words, the trade-o↵ inherent to
the combination of forces has of yet not been addressed in the literature, but rather only
assumed to be beneficial.
This dissertation aims at providing a general theory about the use of militias. The
starting point is that the state has various instruments to achieve a goal (i.e., it can substitute
policies), but it has to choose carefully because it has limited resources and there is inherent
risk in using each instrument. Thus, using either or both regular (e.g., the army) and
irregular forces (militias) is the result of a careful balancing of the costs and benefits of each
one, given the available budget. The theory developed here is built based on the literature
on policy substitutability, especially the work of Palmer and Morgan (2006), who view the
state’s expenditure on policies as a firm using inputs for the production of desirable outcomes
(goods).
The text is organized as follows. The current chapter reviews the literature on militias
and discusses its theoretical underpinnings, as well as point to the limitations that stem from
it. The second chapter presents the theory. I develop a formal model of the state’s decision
to spend on its regular and irregular forces, as if it was a firm producing a good, security.
However, using these forces to produce security also produces liabilities to the state, and so
it is in balancing these that the state optimizes its resource allocation.
Chapters 3 and 4 provide a test to the hypotheses derived from the theory. Chapter 3
presents a cross-national study in which the main objective is to understand which states are
more likely to use militias to deal with their security situation. In particular, it studies the
e↵ects of domestic accountability, focusing on judiciary strength, on the likelihood of using
militias.
Chapter 4, on the other hand, explores how states use militias in tandem with their
regular forces. I study the case of Colombia’s United Self-Defense Forces, a militia active
between 1997 and 2006, that targeted rebel groups and their alleged supporters. I use
municipality-level data to explore the conflict dynamics and how the militia is combined
with the state’s regular forces. In particular, I demonstrate that there is a substitution e↵ect
present in the use of both forces.
Finally, chapter 5 presents the concluding remarks of this study and implications for
future work.
41.1 The Study of Militias
Research on political violence has recently begun to focus on more fine-grained analysis and
data collection in which the assumption of two monolithic sides battling against each other
has been challenged. Although most of these e↵orts pertain the multiplicity of the side
fighting against the state (i.e., there are multiple rebel groups, and they fight each other),
it has only been recently that the side of the state has begun to be understood in terms of
multiple actors (Jentzsch, Kalyvas and Schubiger, 2015).
Indeed, the government rarely fights a war against rebels alone: militias, which are formed
by either the state or local communities independently from, supported or co-opted by the
state, have emerged in many cases of political instability such as civil war. Carey, Mitchell
and Lowe (2013) identify 332 militias active around the world between 1981 and 2007, and
88 out of 178 surveyed countries had at least one militia at some point during this period.
The authors also find the presence of militias in 81% of civil wars in the same period.
Their importance in the study of political violence in general, and civil war in particular,
therefore, cannot be ignored. As Jentzsch, Kalyvas and Schubiger (2015) argue, this nascent
literature allows us to better understand civil war insofar militias change the dynamics of
violence within civil wars, the pattern of recruitment of armed actors, and impact the length
and termination of civil war. In sum, the study of militias also puts into question whether
or not our theoretical understanding of domestic political violence is complete.
1.1.1 Conceptualizing Militias
Militias are referred to by many names: self-defense forces, vigilantes, paramilitaries, pro-
government militias, deathsquads, and so on. A general definition is given by (Kalyvas
and Arjona, 2005, p. 29), who define paramilitaries as “armed groups that are directly
or indirectly aligned with the state and its local agents, were created by the state or are
tolerated by it, but they are outside the state’s formal structure.”1
In many cases, however, authors will use a more restricted definition based on their
particular subject of interest. Jentzsch, Kalyvas and Schubiger (2015, p. 756) for example,
focus on civil wars, and as such define militias as “armed groups that operate alongside state
security forces or independently of the state, aiming to shield local populations from rebel
demands or depredations and seeking to acquire its loyalty or collaboration.”.
Raleigh (2016), on the other hand focuses on context. She argues that militias are created
by elites and “operate as ‘private armies’ for political elites, which broadly include regimes,
members of governments, rebels, political opponents, and community or religious leaders”
1My translation.
5(Raleigh, 2016, p. 284), but that they take di↵erent forms based on the political context in
which they emerge. Thus, she provides a typology of militias: 1) local security providers,
which emerge in areas where government presence is limited or absent; 2) emergency militias,
which are use in periods of crisis such as civil wars, and 3) competition militias, which are
used by elites to gain access to state power and rents.
Some authors focus on the clandestine nature of some militias. Mazzei (2009, pg. 4), for
example, gives us the following definition:
Paramilitary groups are political, armed organizations that are by definition ex-
tramilitary, extra-State, noninstitutional entities, but which mobilize and operate
with the assistance of important allies, including factions within the State. Thus
while o cially illegal, [paramilitary groups] enjoy some of the resources, access,
and status generally exclusive to the State but which is funneled o↵ by political
and military allies.
For Bo¨hmelt and Clayton (2018, pg. 7), however, paramilitaries are “militarized security
units, equipped with (light) military weapons and/or military vehicles, trained and orga-
nized under the central government to support or replace regular military forces”, which the
authors contrast with any other armed force that is loosely a liated with the government
(i.e., pro-government militias, see below).
Carey, Mitchell and Lowe (2013) focus on the connection between the government and
militias. Their definition of a pro-government militia (hereinafter PGM) is “a group that 1.
is identified as pro-government or sponsored by the government (national or subnational),
2. is identified as not being part of the regular security forces, 3. is armed, and 4. has
some level of organization” (Carey, Mitchell and Lowe, 2013, p. 250). The most important
element in their definition is that there must be a link between the group and the state to
be considered a PGM, and sharing an enemy is not enough.
However, there is variation in this link: some militias are openly recognized by the
government (these are called semi-o cial PGMs) whereas others are uno cial and the link
is either obscure (perhaps known but never formalized) and even clandestine in some cases
(informal PGMs). In the latter case, the link between the government and a PGM has been
found because of the works of journalists, activists or human rights organizations, among
others. Indeed, some of these groups are found to have been linked to the government after
they have ceased to exist.
There is thus a plethora of definitions of and names to designate militias. However, they
all seem to share certain elements: that militias are an armed or militarized organization
that is not part of the regular forces of the state, but that is either created and/or used
6by state actors to pursue political purposes. Most of the di↵erences stem from either the
purpose of the group, its origin, or the connection to the state.
For the purposes of this work, I take a simple, broad definition of militias that focuses
only on groups that are aligned with the state: an armed group that operates outside of the
regular forces structure that the state uses to provide security, but didn’t necessarily create
it.
1.1.2 What Do We Know About Militias?
Typically, militias are understood in a principal-agent framework: states delegate some
security tasks to militias because they are unable or unwilling to carry them out. One of
the main questions in the literature has been, therefore, under what conditions do states
use militias to fulfill specific security tasks. These range from protection of the population
and counterinsurgency e↵orts to human rights violations in order to keep civilians in check.
Below I review the findings based on the tasks assigned.
Coup-proofing
Since they are a force independent from the state’s regular forces (military, police, etc.),
militias can be used to deter coups and to protect the leadership against them should they
be attempted. These protective militias are considered to be the agents of regime leaders
and are closely connected to them. Ash (2016, p. 712) argues that “many PGMs are
positioned more as arms of a leader rather than the state. PGMs allow leaders to either
bypass potentially disloyal or ine↵ective armed forces without explicitly threatening the
autonomy of the armed forces as an institution or compensate for military capacity lost as
a result of coup-proofing measures”. The author finds that recent coup attempts greatly
increase the likelihood of PGM formation.
The e↵ect of these coup-proofing militias, however, has come into question. Sudduth
(2017) argues that forming militias may actually trigger coups: as coup risk increases, coup-
proofing becomes more dangerous because any strategy could alert the military and prompt
them to action in order to not allow the leader to become too powerful. Thus, the author
finds that militia emergence is more likely in mid-levels of coup risk: at high risk levels
militias prompt coups, and at low risk levels they are not deemed necessary. In a similar
vein, De Bruin (2018) argues that coup-proofing strategies are e↵ective at decreasing the
success of coup attempts. However, this does not decrease the number of attempts, but
actually increase them because counterbalancing may create grievances among the military
(undermining the institutionality of the military and their interests). Thus, coups may be
7more frequent, albeit less successful.
Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell (2016, p. 61), however, argue that militias are better under-
stood if we consider coup-proofing as part of a broader principal-agent problem: “Beyond
counter-balancing, we argue that outsourcing some tasks in the security area o↵ers e ciency
gains when governments anticipate a threat from rebel groups”. These e ciency gains, they
argue, are cheap force multiplication, specialized information, and legitimacy building. Thus,
they are force substitutes when coup-proofing and complements when fighting rebels. It is
not clear, however, how the use of the same group for building domestic legitimacy allows
for avoiding the loss of international legitimacy (i.e., plausible deniability), especially when
the group has a clear link to the government (in the authors’ terms, a semi-o cial militia).
Nevertheless, their point of militias being used for multiple purposes is of great value, as will
be shown below.
Militias as Power Brokers in Weak Democracies
Militias have also been linked to both the development and weakening of democratic insti-
tutions and processes. Some authors argue that militias are the agents of elites in brokering
power between competing groups and influencing democratic processes. Choi and Raleigh
(2015), for example, argue that militia violence is oriented toward shaping the political power
structure at the local, regional, and national level, at the behest of elites. They argue that
this violence has increased as a result of political fragmentation and competition, and in
response to the rising level of checks and balances on the executive power. In their study of
Africa between 1997 and 2012, they find that the lower the political participation and the
greater the checks and balances are, the more likely militias will be formed in order to co-opt
people to vote one way or another, and this is greater when presidential elections take place.
Similarly, Raleigh (2016) argues that recent democratization has made state access and
resources to be ‘up for grabs’, and thus elites have incentives to create armed groups to pursue
their regional or local interests, which may be at odds with both the central government and
other elites. In this way, militias are a way for contesting access to state power and rents.
Not only that, they provide plausible deniability because the patron can deny having used a
militia. She finds that the more political parties there are in a given country, the more likely
elites will use militias to influence electoral results.
Using a principal-agent framework, Bo¨hmelt and Clayton (2018) argue that militias are
also used to produce some form of stability in weak and/or new democracies, in which con-
trolling the population through the state’s regular forces may be too costly or risky in terms
of accountability. They distinguish between two types of agents of the state: paramilitaries
(see above) and PGMs on the basis that the latter are cheaper and more autonomous, which
8allow for plausible deniability. In this sense, PGMs are used to cheaply maintain the new
political order while having the option to deny any involvement in violating human rights.
Their use in ensuring order after democratization, however, may not come without con-
sequences to the democratic exercise itself. Mazzei’s (2009) analysis of the Latin American
experiences with militias is informative in this regard. She argues that paramilitary groups
emerge as grassroots organizations, aided by the state, when the following conditions are met:
(1) political exclusion has made elites perceive their security to depend on the maintenance
of the status quo, (2) there is a history of providing arms to loyal civilians to defend from
threats (i.e. other civilians/groups), (3) there is a political contestation movement demand-
ing reforms that would undermine the elites’ position, (4) the state cannot overtly use force
against this new threat, (5) moderates within the elite have the upper hand in policy making
instead of the hardliners, and (6) factions of the elite have a sense of grievance regarding
their vulnerability to the reforms which the moderates may enact. Thus, the paramilitaries
are used to maintain the status quo with the help of the hardliner elements of the elite.
In this sense, the author finds that paramilitaries hinder the development of democracy, as
states delegate violent repression.
Repression and Civil War
Most of the literature on militias, however, focuses on the role that they play in violent
repression and armed conflicts. The arguments made in this branch of the literature show
that there are two types of advantages that militias provide as the state’s agents: military
capabilities and shifting accountability. Regarding the first, militias are considered cheap
force multipliers that are flexible and quick to react (Bo¨hmelt and Clayton, 2018) that have
informational advantages since they have access to the population in ways that the army does
not (Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015; Biberman, 2018), which make them useful agents
for the government, and may even provide them with legitimacy when they are made up of
members of the local community where they operate (a demonstration of local support) or
even have former rebels in their ranks (Carey and Mitchell, 2016).
As such, the findings in the literature are that militias are more likely to be used during
periods of political instability such as civil war Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell (2016), ongoing
demonstrations (Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015), and recent democratization (Bo¨hmelt
and Clayton, 2018; Raleigh, 2016). The impact militias have on civil wars, however, is still
open to debate. In their review, Carey and Mitchell (2016) find that, save for the militias
being associated with higher civilian victimization rates, there is no clear evidence that states
that use militias are more e↵ective in counterinsurgency, which means that more fine-grained
analysis about how militias engage in conflict is needed. Not only that, the authors also argue
9that militias may make conflicts last longer because they may be gaining private benefit from
the war, and they may contribute to political instability when conflicts do actually end.
Regarding the second, there is widespread consensus in the literature that militias do the
‘dirty work’ instead of the state, and in so doing they provide the government with plausible
deniability for human rights violations (Mazzei, 2009; Mitchell, Carey and Butler, 2014;
Choi and Raleigh, 2015; Koren, 2017; Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015, 2016; Raleigh,
2016; Bo¨hmelt and Clayton, 2018). This works in one of two ways: the government can
either deny any involvement with the militia if their connection is informal or clandestine
(Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015; Bo¨hmelt and Clayton, 2018), or shift the responsibility
to agents gone rogue or ‘bad apples’ (Mitchell, Carey and Butler, 2014).
At the heart of this is the idea that the state cannot use force overtly against a new
threat (e.g., Mazzei, 2009), which implies that using violent repression may be too costly for
the state. In other words, something constrains leaders from violating human rights. The
literature argues that these constraints come from both domestic and international account-
ability. The domestic source of accountability is primarily democratic institutions, through
which punishment may come in the shape of loss of support, whereas internationally other
states may punish leaders with poor human rights records by withholding aid, restricting
trade, naming and shaming, etc. In particular, the findings in the literature regarding ac-
countability is that the more aid dependent a country is, the more incentive it has to use
militias, and that militias with an informal link to the government are more likely in weak
democracies or anocracies, that is, regimes in the middle of the polity scale (Mitchell, Carey
and Butler, 2014; Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015).
Along the same lines, Koren (2017) argues that militias are not likely to perpetrate
massacres independently of the government, but rather that they are ordained. In other
words, one-sided violence episodes by militias are not likely to be due to loss of agency, but
rather encouraged by and coordinated with the government. The author argues that militias
tip the balance toward the use of mass killings in repression because they lower the costs of
doing so, both in terms of resources spent (they are cheap), and accountability (plausible
deniability), but that this specific use of militias requires at least some degree of control by
the government to be orchestrated.
An issue with the study of militias is that it is not always clear how they come to be.
That is, they may emerge completely autonomously from the government, the government
may encourage and fund their formation, or they can be formed by the government itself.
Mazzei’s (2009) account, for example, supposes that the state, or at least hard-liner factions
of the ruling elite and the military, are always involved in the creation of militias in order to
defend the status quo by whatever means possible. That is at least how she explains militias
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in Latin America and then generalizes from there.
Jentzsch (2014), who does not take a principal-agent approach, argues militias are likely
to emerge in regions of disputed control between the state and the rebel groups. In this sense,
she incorporates Kalyvas’s (2006) framework in our understanding of militias: that they will
be present where neither warring side has majoritarian control (i.e., regions in which military
stalemate has occurred). In her study of Mozambique she finds that community-initiated
militias were mobilized more successfully than militias that were engendered by the state
itself, since the latter had higher desertion rates and even made the security situation worse.
Whatever the case, the origin of militias and how much the government was involved in
it are always di cult to pinpoint. It is no wonder, then, that the focus of the literature has
been on how visible the state’s connection to the militias is, especially given the plausible
deniability argument. Indeed, most scholars simply assume that militias are created by the
state or are readily available to be used.
Although they are usually thought of as complementary to the regular forces, they can
also directly replace them. Eck (2015) argues that militias are used by the government to
fill in the vacuum after military purges in conflict zones. Since the government requires the
military to obtain information in order to keep the population in line, a crippled repressive
apparatus (thanks to the military purge) creates an incentive for the state to fill this vacuum
with militias. However, this is only the case in conflict zones, since purges elsewhere are not
as crippling to the repressive apparatus. What the author identifies, then, is an extreme
situation in which the army is deemed insu cient or untrustworthy to perform security
tasks, and so the government relies on other agents.
Relatedly, Ahram (2011) argues for the use of militias to deal with state failure, rather
than bolstering state capacity through the regular forces. In this regard, he is challenging the
notion of the monopoly of violence as the necessary condition for state formation. Rather,
it is the exception that a single repressive apparatus is able to achieve preponderance over
the rest, and so localized agents are not a signal of but rather a solution to state weakness.
Although not explicitly, he is setting up militias as the agents of states and international
community. For example, he writes “[t]he practice of co-opting local elites as militia leaders
instead of relying on a national army has a already been implemented to some extent as a
tactic in the global War on Terror” (Ahram, 2011, p. 187), and so the author argues that
local provision of security should be the first option, not the last resort.
Whatever the origin, the emergence new armed actor creates new challenges for gover-
nance and for the control of violence itself (Grajales, 2017). Indeed, as Mitchell, Carey and
Butler (2014) find, the presence of militias is associated with an increase in human rights
violations. Relatedly, Koren (2017) finds that militia presence is a good predictor of state-led
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massacres. There is also evidence that links militias to forced displacement: paramilitaries
in Colombia were involved in protecting the lands of their allies while helping with land
grabs (Gutie´rrez San´ın and Vargas Reina, 2016). Indeed, there has been massive displace-
ment given indiscriminate violence in Colombia’s counterinsurgency operations, and when
locals resisted displacement by paramilitaries, even by legal recourse, they were accused of
supporting the guerrillas, which them made them targets of violence (Grajales, 2011, 2013).
The use of militias, moreover, may cause groups in conflict to be trapped in a spiral
of violence against civilians, in which civilian victimization by one group leads to civilian
victimization by another, and the more nonstate agents there are the higher violence against
civilians will be (Raleigh and Choi, 2017). Interestingly, militias may also be correlated with
decreases in state-sponsored violations to civilians. Clayton and Thomson (2016) argue that
the use of civilian defense forces allow for better targeting of insurgents and their sympa-
thizers because of their access to information, which would lower the use of indiscriminate
violence by state agents. The rebels, however, may retaliate in order to deter collaboration
with the state and try to retake control of the area. Thus, although violence by the forces
on the state’s side decreases, violence by the rebels increases, and the authors even found a
short-run e↵ect of increased battle-related deaths in zones where militias emerge.
1.1.3 Delegation of Atrocities and its Critics
As was shown above, the main framework in the literature used to explain militias is the
principal-agent (PA) model. The state (the principal) delegates some task to a militia (the
agent). The issue, however, is that militias may shirk their responsibilities or may pursue
private interests rather than the principal’s. What the delegated task is, however, varies
from study to study. Some take a general view (e.g. Bo¨hmelt and Clayton, 2018; Carey and
Mitchell, 2016), whereas others focus on repression (Mitchell, Carey and Butler, 2014; Carey,
Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015) or force balancing (i.e., coup-proofing) and counterinsurgency
(Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2016).
Regardless of the task at hand, what most authors agree on is that the use of militias o↵ers
plausible deniability: that since the militias are outside of the regular forces and may have an
informal or even clandestine link to the government, if a militia violates human rights then
the government would be able to argue that they are not connected to it or regard the incident
as the loss of agency (i.e., the result of the agent gone rogue). What is implied in some of
these works is that the government is actually outsourcing human rights violations: although
“accountability leads governments to forego repression (...), an alternative for government
o cials is to seek to evade accountability for this violence” (Mitchell, Carey and Butler,
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2014, p. 815), and militias provide exactly this.
Herein lies a problem in the literature: human rights violations are considered, at the
same time and without any way of distinguishing between them, as both the product of
delegation and agency loss. In other words, militias violate human rights either because that
was their job or because they pursue their own interests or use methods that the principal
may not like, and the literature gives no explanation as to the circumstances under which
we could expect one or the other. Indeed, it may be very likely that these are empirically
indistinguishable.
A clear example is found in Mitchell, Carey and Butler (2014), who, in my opinion,
present the most complete application of the PA logic to the study of militias. The authors
argue that since militias may shirk responsibilities or pursue their own agendas, then the
“agency problems pose a heightened risk for the security and safety of citizens” (p. 817). In
the typical PA setting, the principal would then device some mechanism to ensure that the
agent performs well. As for militias, the authors say that
[t]o minimize costly monitoring, attention is paid to screening agents, training,
compensation, and to professional values (...) With respect to militias, these
mechanisms are likely to be absent or implemented less carefully than they are in
the formal security sector. The informal organizations are likely to recruit former
rebels, strategic extremists, or those interested in private gain, such as criminals,
football hooligans (Arkan’s Tigers), or others with their own motivations for
committing violence. (p. 817)
An additional issue arises here: the authors have implicitly built in a second layer to the
PA problem, as agency loss now seems to be an issue of the recruits rather than the militia
commanders. Is it that militia commanders order recruits to go against the state’s interests,
or that recruits go against the commanders’ and thus also against the state’s? Likewise,
and as can be seen above, although the agency costs and the instruments principals have for
dealing with them are acknowledged, these are understudied in the literature2.
But back to the point at hand, the authors
expect that informal groups with no formal or o cial link to the government will
have greater recruitment and operational discretion and less monitoring - and
consequently a higher risk of agency problems and therefore more substantially
a↵ect human rights conditions (p. 817).
2Although this is beyond the scope of this study, this is nonetheless a vital point to study. What
mechanisms do the state use to rein in its militias? As Grajales (2017) put it, using militias does not simply
governing through violence, but also governing the exercise of violence. In this line, the work of Benjamin
Lessing (2017) on how the government’s engagement of cartels shape their violence might be informative.
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However, they then argue that the PA problem can become an advantage:
The thrust of principal-agent logic [sic] is to identify the control problems con-
fronting principals. It suggests you cannot trust the agent. But this logic also
o↵ers opportunities to unscrupulous principals as well as to agents (...) There
may be circumstances when the principal derives a strategic benefit from what
would appear to be the hidden actions of the agent, where the principal can
exploit the distance to the agent (p. 818).
As such, they conclude:
We expect that the ability to evade accountability as a result of a government
collaborating with militias increases the risk to civilians; governments are as-
sumed to be more likely to use a violent strategy if they expect to avoid being
held responsible for it. If challenged by other state or nonstate actors, they can
claim a simple agency problem and lack of control, passing the costs to the “out
of control” or “bad apple” agents (p. 819).
All of this seems to indicate that the authors assume that states want to, but cannot,
violate human rights because of domestic and international accountability (see also Carey,
Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015), and thus use militias to do so, as was explained in the previous
section. Although they mention that there may be a strategic benefit to violating human
rights in providing security, they do not explain exactly what this benefit is, nor under what
circumstances would it be present. In other words, it is as if violating human rights always
has a benefit to it.
Yet, as we know from the repression-dissent literature, the impact of coercion on dissent
is mixed, and it may make matters worse for the state (Davenport, 2007). Indeed, Kalyvas
(2006) argues that indiscriminate violence actually hurts the actor doing it. Why, then,
would states want militias violating human rights if the results of doing so are mixed?
Supposing that militias are actually delegated with human rights violations, how does
the principal appraise this? What are not enough (or too many) violations? In this sense,
given the PA logic, would the state reward militias for committing atrocities, or punish those
that do not commit enough or any?
Moreover, militias do not necessarily engage in human rights violations instead of the
state. Indeed, Stanton (2015) questions the delegation of violence logic of militia use: if states
delegate atrocities to militias, then why do they still violate human rights directly? She finds
that militias rarely target civilians if the state does not. In her study of militias between
1981 and 2010, she finds that when governments target civilians, 56% of the time militias
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do not. Only in 17% of the cases have militias targeting civilians when the government does
not. Her explanation is that the more autonomy the militia has from the state and the less
it depends on a community, the more likely it is to victimize civilians therein.
Similarly, Cohen and Nord˚as (2015) are skeptical of both arguments of civilian victim-
ization as delegation or the loss of agency that comes about by using militias. They argue
that sexual violence by militias is the result of their poor organizational conditions rather
than being delegated by the state. Militias are more likely to use sexual violence when they
su↵er from low cohesion, that is, sexual violence is used as a tool to build cohesion, and this
is highly associated with recruitment by abduction (that is, rape is part of the socialization
into the armed group). Not only that, the authors show that government forces engage in
sexual violence even in the presence of militias. In other words, militias seem to commit
sexual violence not in lieu of, but rather in addition to the state.
Regardless of the fact that states continue to violate human rights directly even when it is
using militias (Stanton, 2015), by this secret delegation the state actually becomes vulnerable
to the truth being found out, not by NGOs or citizens, but by the agents themselves. What
incentives would militias have to not tell on the government? Indeed, it would seem to be
that the state could now be held hostage by the militia. This would be especially true if
militias would take part in transitional justice and truth commissions.
This is precisely what happened in Colombia when the United Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia demobilized, and the state silenced militia commanders by extraditing them to
the US, where they only had to stand trial for drug-tra cking3. The state’s delegation of
violence is either short-sighted or the risk is underestimated. This, however, is not explained
at large in the literature.
Moreover, there a contradiction within the literature regarding two of the advantages of
militias. As was shown, most agree on plausible deniability, but some of the same authors also
argue that militias are a way to increase the legitimacy of the regime (Carey and Mitchell,
2016). How can an organization that violates human rights provide more legitimacy to the
government? Studies on militias, moreover, do not di↵erentiate between militias by their
objectives, but rather just assume that both could be true.
In addition, doubt can be cast upon the plausible deniability itself, as politicians and
army o cers have still been held accountable for the actions of militias, even when their
link is held secret. For example, Spanish politicians (most famously a minister) and security
o cers were prosecuted for their ties to deathsquads (Grupos de Accio´n Local, or GAL) that
hunted down alleged ETA members and supporters. Likewise, in Colombia many politicians
and army o cers were convicted because of their collusion with the paramilitary forces in
3More on this in chapter 4.
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the so-called ‘parapolitics scandal’4.
Regarding international accountability, the literature also points to militia use as a way
of escaping this and thus ensure that aid keeps flowing (Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015).
For the plausible deniability argument to work, we would have to assume that the interna-
tional community only cares about (or at least is much more concerned with) human rights
violations attributed to the state rather than those committed by non-state actors (such as
insurgents and militias). What we assume, in sum, is that the state receives some benefit
from the international community not seeing human rights violations attributable to the
state, and it also receives some benefit from the human rights violations themselves, which
have been secretly delegated to the militias.
Yet, seeing high levels of human rights violations, despite the state not being responsible,
would also be suspect. Indeed, suppose that human rights violations reports show that the
overall level of victimization remains the same, but the ones attributable to the government
are very few or none, and the ones attributable to identified rebel groups also remains
relatively constant. Wouldn’t this raise some eye-brows? In fact, there is evidence that the
international community may not care. In the case of Colombia, for example, to continue
receiving military aid from the US the Colombian government reshu✏ed army o cers accused
of collaborating with militias, and the US went along with it. Not only that, president Clinton
actually waived aid conditionality (Human Rights Watch, 2001).
The delegation must then be broader than simply the dirty work. Rather, the dirty
work would be the type of e↵ort put into place by the militia in order to achieve what the
principal wants: to defeat rebels, to silence the opposition, and so on. Moreover, this brings
up the possibility that human rights violations by militias may not truly be intended by the
government, but rather a price to pay for employing militias.
Indeed, if the state is employing groups that are going to be di cult to control, then
it has to be open to the possibility that agency problems will be great. In this particular
setting, the state is, in the end, accepting human rights violations and the accountability
risk that comes with it as a price to pay for gaining security.
Finally, the literature on militias does not include the state’s regular forces in the story.
As has been said before, states continue to violate human rights through their regular forces
despite the presence of militias (Stanton, 2015), and the armed forces may even coordinate
massacres with the militias (Koren, 2017; Mazzei, 2009; Zelik, 2015). If states will not pay
for human rights violations done by their regular forces, why would they delegate them to
militias?
4Ibidem.
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1.2 Moving Forward
The literature on militias has a consensus on the advantages of militias and the issues
that come with the delegation of security tasks. Although there are a few dissident voices
(Stanton, 2015; Cohen and Nord˚as, 2015), the plausible deniability argument dominates the
literature. However, as I have shown above there are issues with this line of argumentation
that the literature has not addressed, as well as an incomplete investigation into the PA
problems that arise from the use of militias.
Moreover, the fact that militias are only compared to the regular forces in passing is
problematic insofar it ignores a contextual analysis. This is important because not all states
use militias and those that do use them do not do so all the time, which means that most
of the time states consider their regular forces to be more than enough to safeguard them.
Likewise, since the regular forces continue to violate human rights even in the presence of
militias, and that responsibility for violations by militias still falls on politicians and army
o cials, the use of militias cannot be understood as delegating atrocities but rather atrocities
as a by-product of using militias that can run rampant.
As such, I argue that the advantages of militias must be weighed against both the costs
and risks of using them and against the benefits that the state’s regular forces provide with
some costs and risks as well. Overall, then, what is needed is a general, coherent framework
that allows for understanding under which circumstances the state uses militias in addition
to and/or instead of its regular forces, given the trade-o↵s mentioned above.
My proposal is that we view the state as a producer of security whose available tools for
the job (policy choices) are regular and irregular forces. These forces are not only substi-
tutable but also inherently risky to use. As such, I incorporate the insights of the literature
(advantages and risks of militias) into a general theory that explains the state’s decision
to use militias as a cost-benefit calculus embedded in a specific context, both in regards
to the characteristics of the potential militias, as well as those of the state itself and the
circumstances it faces.
By focusing on these trade-o↵s, this study o↵ers a broad and coherent framework with
which to understand militia use. The contribution of this work is manifold. First, by
problematizing the conventional wisdom and presenting evidence against it (which supports
the theory herein), this study allows the field to move forward in a more theoretically sound
direction (see chapter 3). Indeed, it is my goal with this theory to change the way we
typically think of militias.
Second, it allows for a better understanding of the state’s calculus of using armed groups
outside of their typical structure, as well as how the state combines both regular and irregular
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forces. In particular, it brings home the point that the state is actually substituting between
forces inasmuch what it spends on one is no longer available to spend on the other one (see
chapter 4), and so it opens the way forward to understanding how the state combines its
available forces.
In addition, the theory provides us with more implications that have been tested in these
pages. Thus, it is a source of research material that allows building a cohesive and coherent
research agenda. I hint at future possible studies regarding topics such as military quality,
the state’s available resources, international accountability, and the history of conflict.
This study is also of interest to policy-makers and, especially, to human rights advocates.
In this study, and in chapter 3 in particular, I argue that states are less likely to use militias
that more likely put civilians at risk the better the domestic accountability measures are in
place (and hint at the same with international measures), especially the judiciary. Thus, to
better protect human rights throughout the world I argue that directing e↵orts to improve
judicial systems and hold executives accountable for how they produce security to the regime
is of the utmost importance.
Likewise, the implications of force substitution that I explore in chapter 4 may actually
allow for holding the government more accountable for civilian victimization in civil wars.
I argue that the patterns of regular force deployment, combined with patterns of human
rights violations, may allow for predicting militia activity and may therefore allow NGOs
and constituents to suspect that the government is colluding with a violent militia.
That being said, it is not my wish to say that governments should never use militias, as
it is not true that all of them pose an inevitable danger to civilians. Rather, what policy-
makers can learn from this study is that states can maximize their security production by
combining forces in such a way that the risks to civilians is also minimized, and therefore
the overall wellbeing of society could be improved in the long-run. It is impossible to deny
that di↵erent structuring of the security apparatus holds great advantages (even powerful
states use militias), but as long as all forces are kept in check this need not allow for human
rights violations.
Chapter 2
An Economic Theory of
Pro-Government Militias
Introduction
States faced with a security threat spend resources on their armed forces in order to keep their
populations in check, secure their territories and defeat any opposition, armed or otherwise.
However, many states also spend on irregular forces during turbulent times (or to prevent
them). Forcefully, whatever costs come from using irregular forces eat away the resources
available for spending on the regular forces. In other words, there is a trade-o↵ inherent
to using either the regular or irregular forces vis-a-vis one another. At the same time, the
combination of both types of forces may be more e↵ective than solely relying on one or the
other, since each may have its advantages to bring to the fray, and, by combining them, each
force’s weaknesses may be balanced by the other’s strengths (or balancing each other, as in
the case of coup-proofing). Thus, to better understand the circumstances in which states
use militias it is necessary to evaluate the trade-o↵ between allocating resources to one or
another, rather than relying on a single one.
The theory presented here aims at understanding under what circumstances do states
use irregular forces and, once they decide to do so, how they allocate resources among their
available forces. To develop my argument, I model the state’s choice of the use of regular and
irregular forces as a firm’s production function. I follow a similar line to Palmer and Morgan
(2006), who model foreign policy as the production of goods (i.e., desirable outcomes) by
the state, in which each policy in the state’s portfolio is an input for said production. In my
model, however, the state produces a single good, security, whose production has a negative
by-product or ‘bad’: liability. The first subsection presents the argument informally, and the
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second the formal model.
2.1 Providing Security: The Good and the Bad (and
the Ugly)
States devote part of their total budget to military e↵orts in order to face various and
sundry internal threats to their survival, such as terrorism, rebellion, mass dissent and
protest, among others. In this regard, we can think of a state as a firm producing a good:
security. This good relates to the political stability of the country and the maintenance of
control over population and territory, and defeating the opposition, armed or otherwise. To
produce security, the state spends resources on the instruments it has at its disposal, regular
and irregular forces, based on how cost-e↵ective they are. However, spending on either
instrument comes with an undesirable consequence: both forces may become liabilities to the
state: they may shirk their responsibilities, which subtracts from their security e↵orts; they
may commit human rights violations, as carrying out security tasks through certain tactics
could result in the abuse (or death) of civilians and make the state be held accountable for
such actions. Moreover, at the extreme they may turn against the state: the military may
stage coups and militias may become rebel groups themselves.
Thus, the state produces both a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ through the use of its available forces,
and it is through balancing how much of each is produced that the state maximizes its
utility. Figure 2.1 below describes the situation graphically. The horizontal axis depicts the
level of security, whereas the vertical depicts the level of liability. Since the state’s utility is
increasing in the first but decreasing in the second, then any increase of the ‘bad’ must be
compensated by a substantial increase of the ‘good’. As can be seen in the graph, this results
in indi↵erence curves that look like logarithmic functions. Any increase in liability must be
compensated by a greater increase in security. Alternatively, we can consider the increase in
liability as another cost of increasing security. In sum, the state is willing to tolerate some
amount of liabilities (whatever they may be) if it means that security threats will be dealt
with.
The state’s available instruments for the production of security are the regular armed
forces, such as the army and the police, and the irregular forces, such as militia groups1.
What the state faces, then, is an optimization issue: how to distribute its available resources
1There are, of course, many other ways in which states deal with security threats, such as gaining
international support and intervention, resource redistribution, negotiation, etc. The task at hand, however,
is to analyze the calculus of deciding which armed forces to use, and how much of each. For simplicity, then,
I assume that these are the only two inputs available
20
Figure 2.1: The State’s Indi↵erence Curves
between its regular and irregular forces. This choice is dictated by each force’s e ciency in
the production of security while minimizing how much liability is produced.
Indeed, each force may be better suited to deal with di↵erent kinds of threats. For exam-
ple, a militia’s origin in a given region endows it with greater knowledge of the population
and terrain of said region, which gives it an edge relative to the army and the police. On the
other hand, the army may be better suited, for example, to carry out open-field engagements
with rebels, given their training, discipline, and equipment. At the same time, however, both
forces may become liabilities: both forces may violate human rights, produce collateral dam-
age, such as civilian casualties and the destruction of private or public property, shirk their
responsibilities, or even switch sides and stage coups (regular forces) or become rebels them-
selves. Moreover, the state could also be held accountable for the bad actions either force
does.
How does the state allocate its available resources? In the model, the state compares the
security and liability production of each force to one another, mediated by how important
the good and the bad are to the state, and then spends on each in proportion to how their
net e ciencies compare. The trade-o↵ between regular and irregular forces is highly context-
sensitive, as it is not only a calculus of higher security production, but also of minimizing
liability, given the available resources. Indeed, although a state would greatly benefit from
using militias given a security concern, it may refrain from doing so because it is not willing to
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face the liabilities that come with them. Likewise, in a case that militias would produce very
little liability relative to the regular forces, a state may choose to not use them nonetheless
because it doesn’t have a pressing security need for them.
Under what circumstances, then, does the state choose to use regular or irregular forces,
or a combination of both? The answer that the model gives us is that the state will distribute
all available resources between both types of forces based on the proportion in which they
produce security (minus liability) for the state. The allocation of resources thus depends
on how many are available, the net e↵ectiveness of each force (that is, how much each force
contributes to the state’s utility level based on the security-liability trade-o↵), and how
salient the good and the bad are for the state. The following section presents the formal
theoretic model.
2.2 The Theory Formalized
I model the state’s allocation of resources to meet its security provision as a firm’s production
of a single good with a negative by-product. The state has two instruments (or inputs) at
its disposal: the regular forces and the irregular forces2. Both produce a good and a ‘bad’,
security and liability, respectively, at di↵erent rates.
By providing security I mean producing the means with which the state e↵ectively con-
trols and defend its territory, regime, and population. By liability I mean risks to the state’s
well-being that stem from having either or both forces active: damages to property, income,
and population by either force, as well as the chances that the forces will switch sides and
stage coups or rebellions. A more general way to interpret both is to think of the production
of security as the production of military capabilities and liability as indirect costs of this
production.
Note that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, I am not assuming that the state uses
irregular forces necessarily because it wants to have them violate human rights, but rather
human rights violations are an indirect cost or liability of using irregular forces to provide
more security.
The state’s utility is given by the production of the good and the bad, weighed by how
important each is in relation to the other. The state’s utility function is as follows:
U = AQS   BQL (2.1)
2I do not di↵erentiate between types of regular and irregular forces used, such as police and army in
regular forces or semi-o cial and informal militias in the irregular forces, but the general theory could be
expanded to cover such complexity
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Where QS, QL   0 are the produced quantities of the good and the bad, respectively, and
0 < A,B < 1 represent the relative salience of each. I chose to model the utility as a linear
function because of its generality and tractability, which will become especially apparent as
the model is further developed below. As was explained above, we can think of the bad as
an undesirable by-product of the security e↵orts of the state. Thus, the state will put up
with some amount of the bad in order to enjoy more of the good, and I represent this by
simply subtracting the bad from the good.
The good and the bad are produced by allocating resources to the available instruments,
regular and irregular forces. A di cult characteristic to assess regarding militias is whether
they were created by the state or sprung independently. Indeed, especially in the case of
militias with covert links to the government, the existence of some of them is only well-
recorded after they have ceased to exist (Carey, Mitchell and Lowe, 2013), and in many
cases the government’s involvement in the creation of militias is unclear. What we do know,
however, is that the government either creates militias or establishes links with existing ones
in order to enlist their help in the preservation of the regime. Our interest based on the model
is not whether the state creates a militia, but whether it uses one. Although it may seem
like a small di↵erence, our objective is to focus on the use of militias rather than on their
creation, as what the model tells us is how the state balances the use of regular and irregular
forces. The origin itself of the militias is thus out of the scope of this dissertation and thus I
am assuming that both regular and irregular forces are, potentially, readily available to the
state.
Let Ir and Ii denote how many resources are devoted to the regular and irregular forces,
respectively. The use of the instruments is constrained by the state’s defense budget. I
assume that the state will allocate all available resources in its defense budget:
b = Ir + Ii (2.2)
The state must choose how many resources to allocate to each, but it may choose to
spend on either one exclusively. I thus assume that Ir, Ii   0. This also allows for avoiding
negative quantities being spent on each of the forces when deriving the optimal resource
allocation. Negative spending is used to represent short-selling commodities or securities,
which in this particular model could be made to represent the selling of military equipment
or hiring out members of the armed forces to other states or organizations. However, this
consideration would be beyond the purpose of this model for two reasons: first, having the
totality of resources allocated to one force be negative would mean that the whole force has
been hired out and thus, especially in the case of Ir < 0, the state would have no armed
forces at its disposal. Relatedly, the objective here is to understand the use of both types of
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forces in providing security, and short-selling would be inadequate to consider.
I further assume that spending on each force has diminishing marginal returns, so each
new unit allocated provides the state with lower and lower increases in the production of
security. This can be clearly seen from a small thought experiment: imagine increasing
the personnel available to guard a very small territory from zero to ten soldiers and then
comparing this security gain with that of going from a hundred to a hundred and ten soldiers.
The latter may not provide as drastic an increase in security as the former, since one hundred
soldiers may have already been able to secure our hypothetical territory. At the higher end
of spending, then, each new unit would increase security production by an amount quite
close to zero. I assume the same for liability: the killing of the 101st civilian would very
likely be considered as worse than the killing of the 1,001st civilian.
I thus choose the functional form for security and liability production as logarithmic.
Although this means that in the lower ends I may be over or underestimating how much of
the good and the bad are produced by each force, on average this shouldn’t be a problem.
In sum, I model both security and liability production for both forces as the logarithm of
the amount spent on each, which gives us both the desired decreasing marginal returns and
a very tractable form. The production functions of the good and the bad are thus defined
as follows:
QS = ↵1 log (Ir + 1) +  1 log (Ii + 1) (2.3)
QL = ↵2 log (Ir + 1) +  2 log (Ii + 1) (2.4)
Where ↵1,  1   0 and ↵2,  2   0 capture how much each of the forces produces security
and liability, respectively, per resource allocated. Note how this functional form conditions
the increases in utility by each force: the more a state spends, all else equal, the less e↵ective
the next unit spent would be in producing utility for the state. The all else equal assumption
is quite important here, as it means that, as the amount of resources allocated increases, the
e ciency parameters do not change (i.e., that greater resource allocation does not come with
a change in technology that would qualitatively change either force). This, however, may
not be quite realistic empirically, as we may not be able to disentangle resources available
from military quality (see the discussion above on the functional forms), but I will deal with
this issue below.
Note that I added one to each of the quantities inside the logarithms. This is to ensure
that it would be possible for the model to give us corner solutions, that is, situations in which
all resources are spent on a single force rather than distributed between them. Otherwise,
24
spending zero resources on any of them would give us log 0 and thus an undefined solution3.
Replacing the good and the bad as a function of the available instruments in the state’s
utility function we have:
U = A(↵1 log (Ir + 1) +  1 log (Ii + 1))  B(↵2 log (Ir + 1) +  2 log (Ii + 1))
Which reduces to:
U = (A↵1   B↵2) log (Ir + 1) + (A 1   B 2) log (Ii + 1) (2.5)
Thus, the greater the di↵erence between producing security and liability, mediated by
their relative importance, the better an instrument is at producing utility for the state.
However, since each instrument provides increases to said utility at a decreasing rate, it is
likely that the state will use a combination of instruments rather than solely rely on one.
Combining the utility function with the budget constraint (equation 2.2) and the non-
negativity constraints of the instruments, we can form the Lagrangian in order to maximize
the state’s utility:
L = (A↵1 B↵2) log (Ir + 1)+ (A 1 B 2) log (Ii + 1)+ (b  Ir  Ii)+µ1Ir +µ2Ii (2.6)
Taking the first-order conditions (FOCs) regarding the instruments, we have:
 L
 Ir
=
A↵1   B↵2
Ir + 1
   + µ1 = 0 (2.7)
 L
 Ii
=
A 1   B 2
Ii + 1
   + µ2 = 0 (2.8)
And the three constraints:
 (b  Ir   Ii) = 0 (2.9)
µ1Ir = 0 (2.10)
µ2Ii = 0 (2.11)
3Moreover, a quantity lower than 1 spent on any would yield the nonsensical case of negative production
of utility and liability.
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Equation 2.9 recaptures the assumption made above that all the budget is spent, whereas
equations 2.10 and 2.11 capture the non-negativity of the instruments. Using the FOCs we
can study the state’s decision to use militias and how it distributes its resources among both
types of forces. The following sections present both the solutions and general implications
of the theory.
2.3 Choosing to Use a Militia
We can use the FOCs to determine the conditions in which using a militia is worthwhile
for the state to spend on. To do so, we start from the case that the state only uses regular
forces. If such is the case, then it must be that Ii = 0, and so replacing Ir = b and µ1 = 0
into the first FOC (equation 2.7) we can solve for  :
A↵1   B↵2
b+ 1
   + 0 = 0
  =
A↵1   B↵2
b+ 1
(2.12)
Replacing   in the second FOC we can solve for µ2:
µ2 =
A↵1   B↵2
b+ 1
  (A 1   B 2) (2.13)
This is the shadow price of using irregular forces, that is, how much the utility function
would change if we relax the constraint Ii = 0 (i.e., the change in utility for an increase of
one unit in the right hand side of Ii   0)4. Note, however, that the shadow price is presented
with the opposite sign as the change in the objective function: if the shadow price is negative,
it means that by using irregular forces the state would increase its utility, whereas a positive
shadow price means that using the irregular forces actually decreases its utility. The shadow
price can thus be interpreted as the opportunity cost of using militias: if it’s negative it
means that the state is foregoing some utility by not using militias, whereas a positive one
means that the cost of militia use is not worthwhile. Thus, as long as µ2   0, the state will
not allocate resources to the irregular forces.
A negative shadow price thus indicates the case in which a state will use a militia. For the
shadow price to be negative it must be the case that A 1 B 2 > A↵1 B↵2b+1 . Put di↵erently,
what the first ‘unit’ spent on irregular forces adds to the utility function of the state must
4The shadow price, however, does not tell us about the optimal allocation of resources, only that increasing
the constraint’s right-hand side by one unit would mean a  µ2 change in the utility level. The optimum
combination will be explained in the next section below.
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be greater than the (roughly) average contribution of a ‘unit’ spent on the regular forces to
said function if all resources were spent on the latter.
As was discussed above, a militia can either be formed by the state or it can form on
its own. According to Staniland (2015), in the latter case a state will pursue one of several
strategies: it can suppress, tolerate, collude with or integrate them into the regular forces.
We can use the shadow price to understand the state’s behavior towards militias in light
of Staniland’s classification: if the shadow price is negative, then the state would create a
militia or make use of an existing one. If the shadow price is zero, however, then the state
would not create a militia but would tolerate one that already exists. Finally, a positive
shadow price means not creating a militia or suppressing an existing one.
2.3.1 Choosing to Only Use Militias
The same analysis can be conducted for the case in which the resources spent on the regular
forces would be zero. Although in general terms this could seem nonsensical (there exist
no states that do not employ regular forces), it may seem more plausible if we make our
analysis on the subnational level: we may find that a state chooses to use a militia in a given
territory instead of the regular forces or a even combination of both.
Peru’s fight against Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) may be an example of this. In
remote agricultural communities peasants organized into groups called Rondas Campesinas
to defend themselves from cattle thieves and petty crime, since state presence was lacking.
The Fumijori government took advantage of the existence of these Rondas and provided
them with resources and weapons in order for them to fend o↵ advances by the rebels in
remote regions, rather than providing a garrison. In some small regions of Peru, then, the
regular forces were replaced by a militia.
Going back to the model, if Ir = 0 then by solving for µ1 in the first FOC (equation 2.7)
we can find the shadow price of using regular forces:
µ1 =
A 1   B 2
b+ 1
  (A↵1   B↵2) (2.14)
A state will decide to only use militias in a certain area if the regular forces’ shadow price
is positive: A 1 B 2b+1 > (A↵1 B↵2). If we interpret the Peruvian case in this light, we could
see how, with so few resources available for these regions, arming a militia that had privileged
information regarding local conditions was a much more e↵ective option than sending the
army in, especially since this would mean thinning army presence somewhere else. Moreover,
since this militia was created by locals with the objective of protecting themselves and their
property, potential abuses against other civilians were not likely, and their small size and
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direct connection with the government would have prevented them from becoming a threat
to Peruvian authorities.
2.4 Combining Forces
If the state decides to use both forces, then we can use the model to learn how much goes
into each and how changes in the parameters influence the amounts being spent on each.
From the first two FOCs we can compare the Marginal Returns of Utility (MRU) of the use
of both forces by simply solving each FOC for   and then equating the resulting expressions:
A↵1   B↵2
Ir + 1
=
A 1   B 2
Ii + 1
Which can be reordered as the following:
Ii + 1
Ir + 1
=
A 1   B 2
A↵1   B↵2 (2.15)
That is, the proportion between the amounts spent on each force roughly equals the
proportion between their net e ciencies. We can then solve for each of the instruments. For
example:
Ir =
A↵1   B↵2
A 1   B 2 (Ii + 1)  1
Suppose that the proportion A↵1 B↵2A 1 B 2 equals to 1.5. This means that Ir = 1.5(Ii+1)  1,
and so by the budget constraint we have Ii = (b  0.5)/2.5. Suppose b = 100, then we have
Ii = 39.8 and Ir = 60.2.
Consider equation 2.15 closely: the amount of Ir used will increase as ↵1 increases, but
will decrease as ↵2 increases, mediated by the salience of security and liability. That is, the
more e↵ective the regular forces are at producing security with as little liability as possible,
the more resources will be allocated to them. Likewise, increases in  1 and  2 will decrease
and increase, respectively, the amount of Ir that the state uses, since these changes would
mean that the e ciency of Ii is increasing/decreasing relative to Ir.
More specifically, the amounts spent on each instrument, in terms of the budget, are:
Ir =
(b+ 1)(A↵1   B↵2)  (A 1   B 2)
(A↵1   B↵2) + (A 1   B 2) (2.16)
Ii =
(b+ 1)(A 1   B 2)  (A↵1   B↵2)
(A↵1   B↵2) + (A 1   B 2) (2.17)
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Taking either one, we could see the e↵ect of each parameter on the amount spent on
either force.
If the state decides to use a militia, then it is accepting two trade-o↵s. The first is that
it is gaining some security in exchange for some risk, as was discussed above. The second is
that there may be a substitution of forces. Recall equation 2.15:
Ii + 1
Ir + 1
=
A 1   B 2
A↵1   B↵2
According to the model, in order to spend resources on a militia, the state has to stop
spending (spend less) on its regular forces. Consider a scenario in which the right-hand side
of equation 2.15 equals 110 . That is, the state is roughly spending 90% of its resources into
regular forces and only 10% into its militias. Suppose that, in a country involved in civil war,
the security situation becomes one in which the share of the population suspected of aiding
rebels increases. Based on the discussed advantages, we would expect that militias become
relatively more e↵ective at providing security. Suppose then that the right-hand of equation
2.15 now equals 210 . The new distribution of resources would thus be 80% into regular forces
and 20% into militias.
What equation 2.15 defines is the basis for the substitutability of forces: when the security
needs make militias relatively more e↵ective than the regular forces, and the risk of using
militias is not very high relative to their benefit, mediated by the salience of each, then the
state will increase their use. This necessarily means, all else equal, decreasing the use of the
other one. The state thus not only combines forces but also substitutes them as the need
arises.
2.5 Implications
What do the model solutions mean substantively? From the necessary condition A 1 B 2 >
A↵1 B↵2
b+1 for allocating resources to irregular forces we can clearly see how each parameter
contributes to the likelihood of militia use. Likewise, from equations 2.16 and 2.17 pertaining
the combination of forces, we can see how the amount spent on each force is impacted by
changes in each parameter. Below I explore the impact of the budget constraint, security
and liability production, and the relative salience of the good and the bad.
2.5.1 The Budget Constraint
Recall that a state will use irregular forces if and only if A 1 B 2 > A↵1 B↵2b+1 . All else equal,
the greater the budget, the more likely the state will use a militia. The assumption ‘all else
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equal’ in these budget considerations is extremely important. Indeed, in reality, changes in
the military budget of a state are very likely to be tied to access to new arms and technology,
which would inevitably impact the e ciency parameters of the model and thus require a new
optimum to be calculated. The insights regarding the budget must then be interpreted with
care. In the cases of (relatively) small increases in the resources available for the production
of security, it wouldn’t be far-fetched to assume that the other parameters hold constant and
thus the best alternative could be to simply to start spending on the irregular forces.
The reasoning behind this is not simply that the more resources a state has the more of
everything it does. Rather, the more a state has spent on the regular forces, the lower the
return on utility of the next unit spent, all else equal. This would be a case in which the
army is reaching a point of near saturation, that each new unit spent brings about very small
increases to the utility function (at least compared to the potential benefits of a militia), and
so starting to use irregular forces is optimal. In this sense, my model presents an alternative
explanation to the findings of Bo¨hmelt and Clayton (2018) that the greater the GDP of a
state, the more likely it is to use auxiliary forces.
If militias are already in use, then an increase in the budget, all else equal, would mean
that more is spent on each one, but the proportion of the distribution remains the same.
Indeed, according to equation 2.15, the distribution of resources is based on the net e ciency
of each force, but only the gross amounts, not the proportion, depends on the total budget.
Empirically, however, it may be the case that increases in resources are not independent
from changes in the e↵ectiveness of each force. Nevertheless, the regular forces may not be
able to absorb all of the new resources e↵ectively.
Indeed, evidence from Colombia suggests that exogenous increases in the resources avail-
able for war find their way into both types of forces: a fraction of the resources given to
the Colombian army by the US government seems to have been funneled into the United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) (Dube and Naidu, 2015). It may be argued that
this increase in the war budget was substantial enough to improve the army’s technology
(i.e., not all else was equal). Yet, it must not have been a large enough impact, since it was
deemed more e↵ective to give some of it to the AUC.
Three conclusions come from budget considerations: all else equal, (1) the larger the
budget the more likely a state will use militias, (2) su cient increases in the budget will
allow a state to start using militias, and (3) if a militia is already in use, then an increase
in resources will result in a higher spending on both forces. Thus, by analyzing available
country resources and sources of resource change we could pinpoint which countries would
be more likely to use militias. Here I briefly explore some of these.
Regarding the first, the larger a country’s economy, for example, the more resources it has
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available for dealing with a security threat, and so the more likely it will be able to support
both regular and irregular forces. Moreover, increases in GDP would make a state more
likely to use a militia, provided that such an increase would not provoke a modernization of
the regular forces.
Regarding the second, the military budget may also increase because a state is receiving
aid from another. This comes in two flavors: first, general aid (such as developmental aid)
increases the overall resources of a state. An aid recipient thus could be able to spend more
on its military budget because some of its other financial obligations are met through the
aid. In this specific case, the model gives us an alternative explanation to the work of Carey,
Colaresi and Mitchell (2015), who find that aid-dependent countries are more likely to use
militias.
The second type of aid that interests us here is military. Receiving more money, weapons
and armament may allow the state to have enough to spend on militias even if the military
aid means a change in the e ciency of the armed forces. Think about an arms transfer
to a state involved in civil war. It is likely that this transfer will result in a surplus of
weapons, which may then be used to equip a militia with (better) arms. Likewise, a purely
financial transfer may indeed bolster the capabilities of the regular forces, but they may not
be e cient enough to absorb all the new resources rather than partially allocating resources
to a militia. For example, the United States’ military aid to Iraq and Afghanistan was partly
devoted to tribal militias and village security forces.
A general implication of this is that donors may be inadvertently propping up militias
around the world, thus potentially undermining the safety and development of the commu-
nities they are trying to empower in the first place. Moreover, aid may directly or indirectly
increase the funding for militia that are already active. Dube and Naidu (2015) shows evi-
dence of this for the Colombian case. What this implies is that donors must take into account
the possibility of fund diversion towards groups that they may not wish to fund. Thus, if
the international donor community wishes to curb the use of militias that are potentially
dangerous to civilians, then aid must come with conditionality that directly addresses this5.
2.5.2 E ciency: Security and Liability
The model tells us that the greater the e ciency of a potential militia, the more likely that
a state will use it. However, key to the model is that the use of militias depends not just on
how they may fare but how the regular forces fare. In other words, we should see militias
in circumstances in which, all else equal, militias are su ciently e↵ective in comparison to
5See chapter 3 below.
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the regular forces to warrant their use. The calculus depends on the security gains and the
liability of each. I will explore these below.
First and foremost, for a state to consider using militias to supplement the regular forces
there must be a threat present: insurrections, protests, coup attempts, or a high risk of expe-
riencing any of these. In general, political instability stretches regular forces. Experiencing
or expecting to experience violent and non-violent campaigns against the state is the first
drive of using militias. However, not all states with instability use militias, as their regular
forces may prove enough to deal with the threat.
Recall that the model tells us that the more able the military are the less likely the state
will be inclined to use militias. Greater technology and training of the armed forces should
therefore make it less likely to use militias, all else equal. Taking a su ciently strong military
as the starting point, what causes the regular forces to become less cost-e↵ective relative to
the irregular forces in producing security?
The advantages of militias relative to the regular forces (in terms of security provision)
are local information, maneuverability, and low costs of deployment (Carey and Mitchell,
2017). In order to understand their use, we must match these advantages to the type of
threat that the state faces or would face and in which context. First, if militias are used
because of an informational advantage, then the government must be facing a threat in which
there is an informational asymmetry in favor of the opponent. Typically, this is the hallmark
of insurgencies relative to other types of domestic threats. In insurgencies, the line between
combatant and civilian is blurred, it is di cult to assess who supports whom, and rebels,
usually employing guerrilla and terrorist tactics, have a better understanding of the local
landscape. A militia, however, helps to level the field because their local knowledge allows
for e↵ective intelligence gathering regarding the population and the local terrain.
Along the same lines, the composition of society may make it harder for the regular forces
to maneuver: an ethnically diverse society in which ethnic lines align with conflict lines, for
example, exacerbates information problems. Indeed, members of the regular forces may face
not only language and cultural barriers in their handling of the locals in question, if they
are not co-ethnics, but also a general lack of knowledge of the local societal dynamics. A
militia whose members are from the ethnic group that the state wishes to police may help
solve this. As Lyall (2010) argues, co-ethnics may be better suited for intelligence gathering
and controlling the locals.
Second, militias are typically more autonomous than the regular forces: they tend to be
light, movable units that are cheap and fast to deploy6. Using a militia, therefore, enables the
6Anecdotal evidence from Colombia shows that members of a militia usually carried equipment that
weighed a fraction of that of the military, and they could set up and break camp much faster than the army.
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state to have a quick response to threats and have units that are able to maneuver through
rough terrain. In this regard, a militia can function as a rebel group that uses guerrilla
tactics: the militia can quickly mount an o↵ensive and retreat as quick. Like insurgents,
then, militias use hit-and-run tactics and terrorist attacks.
Finally, militias are a cheap force multiplier. If the regular forces are stretched too
thin, then militias may become a viable option to extend the state’s control without much
additional cost. Alternatively, militias would allow to cheaply police the population, whether
inside or outside the conflict zone, in order to free resources that would go towards the
battlefield7. We must thus identify situations in which cheap deployment is needed. The
number of battlefronts determines how much the state needs to divide its forces across
territory. An insurgency spanning most (if not all) of the country, or facing multiple rebel
groups can be such cases. Moreover, if the state faces an external threat, then its regular
forces are already engaged along the borders or beyond, and so militias may be an ideal
candidate to secure internal matters while the army handles the external threat.
However, despite experiencing a threat to security, not all governments employ militias.
Indeed, although militias may present the government with an e cient way of producing
extra security, they may also come with a high price in terms of liability. The gain in security
is thus conditioned by liability minimization, and this applies to regular and irregular forces.
Both forces may produce collateral damage: civilian casualties and destruction of property.
Both may also shirk their responsibilities, engage in criminal activity and plunder, and maybe
even turn against the state. Regular forces may attempt a coup to take control of the state
or change the leadership and militias may become rebel groups themselves ad engage the
regular forces.
The amount of liability produced depends on how much control the state has over each
of the forces. The more autonomous the forces are, the more likely that excesses and side-
switching may occur. Indeed, many militias are actually established to secure the elite rather
than the country: they are one possible coup-proofing mechanism. In terms of the model,
the security provided by these particular militias o↵sets the liability produced by the regular
forces in terms of the risks of experiencing coups.
The state must assess how much of a risk it takes on when using irregular forces. If the
state expects not to be able to have much control over militias then it may prefer not to
employ them or only use them, for example, in regions in which the damage militias can
do is minimized. In that regard, the more important a location is, whether militarily or
economically, the less likely a militia would be used because the liability may be greater.
Likewise, the state would prefer to minimize the human costs of militia use (i.e., civilian
7Notice how this echoes the budget considerations explored above
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victimization), particularly in regions whose population the state heavily depends on.
The liability produced by the excessive use of force by either the regular or irregular
forces can be aggravated by how much the state is held accountable for the actions of either.
The damages caused by a militia (or the regular forces, for that matter) may be aggravated
if the state were to be held responsible, especially when it comes to human rights violations.
A state that is not held accountable for human rights violations does not have to worry
about abuses and excesses from either force. One that may be held accountable, however,
has to rein in its forces to avoid abuses. Since it may not have as much control over militias,
then they may engage in abuses more frequently. As such, deciding whether to use a militia
might depend on how much the state can control it so that it does not have to pay for the
militia’s excesses - if accountability exists.
Indeed, governmental and military o cials around the world have faced trials for their
ties to militias, which means that they either miscalculated the chances of being caught or
accepted the risk because of how much security benefits they would obtain8.
Accountability for human rights violations stem from two sources: international and
domestic. Internationally, for example, we know from Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell (2015)
that states are more likely to use informal militias if they are further away from democracies,
since they wouldn’t be monitored as easily. Other factors that could increase international ac-
countability, and therefore make it costlier to use militias, are ratified human rights treaties,
which make states vulnerable to pressure from other states, (I)NGOs, and domestic players
if they do not comply (Hathaway, 2007; Simmons, 2009). Moreover, many of these treaties
require states to report on their human rights record. Although it is self-reporting, there is
an increase in pressure to uphold human rights.
Domestically, we could think of institutional factors, such as regime type and checks and
balances systems, as well as domestic interest groups that could hold the state accountable
for the actions of militias. For example, a strong judiciary could bring leaders to trial;
media freedom and access would mean that there is investigative journalism e↵ective enough
to uncover militia connections to the state; and Human Rights (I)NGOs may pressure the
government into not using militias. Not only that, human rights treaties also help domestic
communities into pressuring their governments (Grajales, 2017).
If militias are already in use, then changes in how much a force produces security relative
to the other will result in more money being spent on the one that is now relatively more
e cient. Likewise, an increase in liability of one force, all else equal, will result in spending
less on the same.
8Note that this is also true of the regular forces: some states are only held accountable for their army’s
behavior if the whistle is blown (e.g., the Abu Ghraib scandal)
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What the theory points us towards is an analysis of changes in the dynamics of conflict
and the characteristics of the state. For example, if rebel groups start using tactics that
exploit informational asymmetry, then the new security concerns may tilt the favor into
using more irregular forces.
We could also consider these issues sub-nationally: since security concerns (e.g., civil
wars) rarely cover the entirety of a state’s territory, then we should expect the security
calculus to vary from region to region. Likewise, the risk of using militias may be higher
in some regions than in others. We may thus use the theory to understand how the use of
regular and irregular forces varies from region to region. Of course, we should expect irregular
forces to be more likely in territories experiencing violence or at risk of doing so, but only if
the risk of side-switching, collateral damage and civilian victimization is comparatively low.
In sum, what the model tells us regarding the e ciency of forces is that there are specific
circumstances regarding how much security each force produces and how much of a risk
spending on them would be that would make using militias a viable option, and how much
of each force to use in any particular situation. However, how security and liability impact
the state’s utility depends on how salient they are relative to each other. The following
subsection explores this.
2.5.3 Salience
Changes in salience mean that either security or liability become more important to the
state vis-a-vis the other. Since the salience parameters simultaneously a↵ect both forces,
their e↵ect is not straightforward: an increase in the salience of security relative to liability,
for example, may tilt the balance towards either force, as this change is very sensitive to the
rest of the parameters. In order to understand this, it is useful to check the derivative of the
irregular forces’ shadow price with respect to A or B.
Recall that this shadow price must be negative in order for a state to use militias:
A↵1 B↵2
b+1   (A 1   B 2) < 0. Rearranging the terms, we get: A↵1 B↵2A 1 B 2   (b + 1) < 0.
For a change in salience to increase the likelihood of using militias (or increase whatever is
being spent on them), the left-hand expression must decrease.
Since both salience parameters change relative to each other, we can analyze the derivative
of one and simply conclude that the opposite holds for the other. The derivative of A↵1 B↵2A 1 B 2  
(b+1) with respect to A is ↵1A 1 B 2  
 1(A↵1 B↵2)
(A 1 B 2)2 . In order for an increase of A to positively
a↵ect Ii, then this should be negative. Thus, it must be the case that
↵1
A 1   B 2 <
 1(A↵1   B↵2)
(A 1   B 2)2
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Which can be simplified to the following:
↵1
 1
<
A↵1   B↵2
A 1   B 2
And further to:
 1
 2
<
↵1
↵2
That is, the ratio between security and liability production by the irregular forces must
be smaller than that of the regular forces for an increase in the relative salience of security
(which can also be considered a decrease in the relative salience of liability) to result in
an increase of Ii. This is counterintuitive: that security becomes more salient does not
necessarily translate into force substitution towards the force with the highest e ciency, but
rather the one that gives relatively similar levels of security and liability. In other words,
the force with the less net e ciency will benefit from an increase in the salience of security.
The opposite holds for an increase (decrease) in the salience of liability (security): Ii will
increase in this case if  1 2 >
↵1
↵2
.
Consider the first of the two expressions closely: it is very likely that the inequality
 1
 2
< ↵1↵2 will hold most of the time. Indeed, regular forces are generally more powerful than
militias and the greater control that the state has over them makes them less likely to result
in higher liabilities. What the model would then make us expect is that an increase in the
relative salience of security will make it more likely that a state will use militias. Likewise, an
increase in the relative salience of liability translates into a lower likelihood of using militias.
Likewise, the salience of security relative to liability plays an important role in the division
of resources among available forces. As was discussed above, when security becomes more
important to the state relative to liability, then the less e cient force actually benefits from
this change. Assuming, as above, that the regular forces produce more security and less
liability than irregular forces, then when security becomes more important we should expect
more resources to be put into irregular forces, even at the cost of regular forces.
This can be seen from equation 2.15. Recall that if the right hand of the equation
increases (A 1 B 2A↵1 B↵2 ), then Ii must also increase. By taking the derivative of
A 1 B 2
A↵1 B↵2 with
respect to A (the salience of security), and then considering the case that this derivative
is greater than zero, we can conclude that an increase in A will mean an increase in II if
and only if  1 2 <
↵1
↵2
, which is the same expression that we have just considered. Thus, the
more security becomes important, the more resources would be devoted to militias. On the
contrary, the more liability becomes important, the less the state would spend on militias,
up to the point of stopping to use them altogether.
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What causes changes in the salience of the good and the bad? Consider, for example,
the dynamics of a particular civil war: if the rebels are being successful in their campaign,
then military success would become more important to the state than safeguarding human
rights or avoiding property damage. Moreover, although arming militias could be risky in
the future, an assessment of potential defeat by the rebels would decrease how much this is
a concern for the state. In this regard, militias would act as some sort of last resort. Loss of
territory to the rebels and an increasing amount of casualties on the state’s side would thus
make it more likely that militias are used, or further spend on them.
Relatedly, if rebels receive outside assistance, such as resources, arms, intel or even sol-
diers, then the state’s assessment of how successful they can be will change. Indeed, since
rebels who receive aid are more capable militarily, the state will value providing security
more than the indirect costs it brings in order to compensate for the heightened threat.
Liability, on the other hand, becomes more important the more attention is paid to
human rights, for example. International pressure is of interest here: the more a state is
put in the spotlight for its human rights record, the more salient human rights violations
become. Naming and shaming and international sanctioning could thus be associated with
an increase in the salience of liability. Domestically, citizen mobilization and the work of the
press, NGOs, etc., could make it so that the population is more likely to pressure the state.
2.6 Conclusion
The theory presented here aims at explaining how conflict and institutional dynamics de-
termine whether or not militias are used by states. The economic model presented above
focuses on the state’s decision to allocate resources into its available tools for procuring se-
curity, given how e↵ective each one is and how much liability the state is willing to accept
for using them. This optimization problem may be thought of in general (i.e., nation-wide)
or even from local scenario to local scenario. That is, we can think of our equations as
applying to the whole war budget of the state or to the deployment of forces to specific
territories given some resource allocation to that territory in order to further explore the
microdynamics of the state’s provision of security.
It must be noted that the argument used here is decision-theoretic: I take non-state
groups as exogenous. My objective is to understand how the state organizes and uses its
repressive apparatus given a threatening environment and institutional and resource con-
straints. The seemingly generalized use of militias around the world tells us that states are
willing to make use of them despite how liable they may be (Carey and Mitchell, 2017) to
face a plethora of security challenges. In this sense, conceptualizing contestation movements,
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whether armed or unarmed, and the militias themselves as exogenous allows for understand-
ing the state’s calculus of resource allocation. In other words, militias are generally part of
the state’s optimal strategy to face domestic threats. What the model helps us understand
is what are the precise circumstances that make them so9.
The insights of the theory point towards assessing which states use militias and when,
and how they are used relative to the regular forces. In this chapter I have broadly dis-
cussed several implications of the theory by analyzing the e↵ects of each of the parameters.
The following chapters focus on developing some of these implications more thoroughly and
testing them empirically.
In chapter 3 I focus on the security-liability calculus of using militias. In particular, I
explore how domestic accountability conditions the use of militias, and how this interacts
with the presence of security threats (civil wars in particular) in the state’s calculus about
which forces to use. Through this study, I am able to perform a critical test of this theory
and the conventional wisdom, as both lead us to di↵erent expectations.
In chapter 4 I focus on policy substitutability. Since the theory tells us that, given a
fixed budget, the more a state spends on one force the less it has available to spend on the
other, then we should see patterns of substitution across forces. To test this, I present a case
study of Colombia’s most recent civil war. In it, I explore the relation between the level of
activity of the militia and the level of activity of the Colombian Armed Forces.
9Nevertheless, future research would benefit from taking an approach that gives agency to either rebel
groups, opposition movements, militias, or both. Indeed, some research has started to go down this line:
Sabine Otto’s work, for example, shows how militias and rebel groups switch sides back and forth (Otto,
2015, 2018). Understanding the state’s decision-making about using militias may open more avenues of
research about the relations between all conflict parties.
Chapter 3
Balancing Security and Liability: A
Cross-National Study
Introduction
The economic theory of pro-government militias points to several expectations regarding
a country’s security situation and how much liability would be tolerable given the security
needs, the salience of each and how many resources they have available. This chapter explores
some of these implications more concretely. In particular, I focus here on the liability calculus
of using militias to respond to a major security threat, such as civil war.
Militias have been identified as the agents that perform the state’s dirty work, but the way
this is portrayed in the literature is as if atrocities, rather than the security gains they might
produce, are the objective of using militias. Moreover, as was discussed in the introduction,
what is puzzling about this is that states have continued to violate human rights despite
using militias and politicians and army o cials have had to pay the consequences of using
these groups, even when the connections between the state and the militias were clandestine.
The delegation of atrocities and the shift of responsibility may thus be put into question.
This chapter presents an alternative view. Based on the general framework developed
above, I explore how security and liability concerns interact to make the use of militia more
or less likely. My main focus here is how much can the state be held accountable for the
actions of its agents, as this drives the likelihood of using militias in addition to the regular
forces. In a nutshell, I expect that militias are more likely to be used, all else equal, in states
that a) are experiencing civil wars, and b) have a weak judiciary system. The degree of
control over militias, however, is also important inasmuch the more control the government
has over these groups, the lower the risk of using them because it can choose whether militias
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violate or respect human rights.
Since the plausible deniability argument would actually lead us to expect that the greater
accountability there is, the greater the incentive to use a militia in order to avoid being held
responsible for human rights violations, and my argument leads us to expect the opposite,
this study will allow to perform a critical test of both arguments in a simple way.
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section uses the economic theory of pro-
government militias to derive testable implications regarding the impact of the strength of
the judicial system on the likelihood of using militias. The second presents the research
design and operationalization of concepts. The third section presents the results of the
statistical regressions. Finally, the fourth section discusses the conclusions and implications
of the findings.
3.1 Delegating Atrocities: A Means or an End?
The conventional wisdom regarding militias, especially those that do not have a clear, o cial
connection to the government, is that they are tasked with doing the regular forces’ dirty
work: kidnappings, summary killings, civilian harassment, etc. The government thus shifts
responsibility away from itself by using militias. This ‘plausible deniability’ perspective,
however, may be flawed in two ways: first, it supposes that states want to, but cannot,
violate human rights and so they find agents to do so. This would seem to imply that these
violations are an end by themselves rather than a means to achieve something else, such as
more control over the population or more security in general, or an unwanted consequence.
Alternatively, it would seem to imply that human rights violations are always beneficial
to the state, despite what the literature on the repression-dissent nexus tells us that violent
repression may backfire (Davenport, 2007). Not only that, states continue to violate human
rights in addition to or even instead of the militias doing so (Stanton, 2015).
The second issue, as was discussed in chapter 1, is that this shift of responsibility is not
perfect, as o cials from around the world are accused of and sentenced for their ties to
militias, which means that either they miscalculated the risks of delegating the dirty work
or the alternative to this delegation was, in terms of expected utility, not as good as relying
solely on the regular forces. What the economic theory of pro-government militias tells us
is that governments employ militias because of the security they provide and in spite of the
liability inherent to their use. Since I do not assume that states wish to violate human rights
but merely produce more security, then in my model states use militias despite human rights
violations rather than because of them.
The use of militias thus depends on balancing security and liability. Recall equation 2.11
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(the shadow price of using militias):
µ2 =
A↵1   B↵2
b+ 1
  (A 1   B 2)
which tells us that a militia will be used if A 1   B 2 > A↵1 B↵2b+1 . Whatever makes  1
and ↵2 increase and  2 and ↵1 decrease will make it more likely that the inequality holds.
As was discussed above, a militia has di↵erent logistical advantages relative to the regular
forces which could make it more e↵ective in some circumstances: local information, cheap
deployment, and autonomy. Thus, depending on the threat that the state faces, using a
militia could be part of the optimal strategy.
A state facing the risk of a coup, terrorist attacks, demonstrations and protests by the
opposition, or even civil war, might be more capable of safeguarding itself if it uses militias.
When there is the risk of a coup, militias provide security to counter the liability that is
produced by the regular forces. When the state faces a terrorist threat, militias could be
used to both harden potential targets and navigate the population in search of the terrorists
in a more cost-e↵ective way than the army. Likewise, using the army to quell popular dissent
or sway elections in the incumbent’s favor may be too costly, but using militias to do so may
be very cheap.
However, I argue that, perhaps with the exception of coups, no security threat is more
fertile ground for a militia than a civil war. If war is broadly defined as “sustained, coordi-
nated violence between political organizations” (Levy and Thompson, 2010, p. 5), we can
define civil war as an armed conflict in which a “government [confronts] organized, armed
opposition originating withing the country’s borders, with significant military confrontations
between government and rebel group forces” (Stanton, 2016, p. 3).
Note that common to notions of (civil) war is the condition of sustained violence, as it
di↵erentiates war from other forms of conflict, violent or nonviolent (Levy and Thompson,
2010). Indeed, most definitions of civil war, conceptual and operational, involve not only an
element of duration, but also of magnitude, which is usually thought of in terms of casualties
(Stanton, 2016). In addition, “states fight domestic challengers in internal or civil wars for
the control of the state or for secession from the state” (Levy and Thompson, 2010, p. 7),
that is, this phenomenon of organized, sustained violence is at its core a contest for the
authority over a territory between two political entities, one of them being the state. As
such,
most revolutions, sustained peasant insurrections, “revolutionary” or ethnic in-
surgencies, anticolonial uprisings, and resistance wars against foreign occupiers
are civil wars. On the other hand, violent protests, riots, crime, and low-level
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banditry, all of which leave sovereignty pretty much intact, are excluded from
this category (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 19).
Why would a civil war make it more likely that a state uses a militia? First and foremost,
and as discussed above, civil wars put the leader’s survival and the state’s territorial integrity
at risk. As such, security becomes much more salient than the risks of producing it.
Second, compared to other conflicts, civil wars are particularly taxing to a state’s security
apparatus. Indeed, the regular forces may be stretched too thin if a rebellion covers many
parts of the state’s territory. If this were the case, our theory tells us that instead of spending
more on the regular forces, starting to spend on militias may be more cost-e↵ective, as with
fewer resources more regions could be safeguarded.
Finally, the regular forces may not be as e cient in keeping control over specific localities
as a militia might be. Recall that one of the advantages of militias is their privileged
information. If rebels and their supporters are hiding within the population, then local
militias may have an edge relative to the regular forces in rooting them out, or preventing
civilian help to rebels altogether. Moreover, their informational advantage may also give
them an edge relative to the regular forces in terms of terrain navigation.
However, the theory also tells us that a militia may be more of a liability than the regular
forces. If the risk of using militias is large enough, then a state may forgo their use altogether,
despite the advantages they might bring to the table. Since the state has less control over
them, it may be more likely that militias shirk their responsibilities more than the regular
forces, and even perform activities that may not be sanctioned by the government.
The degree of control over a militia may vary, of course, and as such the type of militia
may provide us with di↵erent levels of liability. As such, I conclude that, all else equal, the
regular forces are less likely to produce liability than militias because the state can make
the former toe the line much easier than it can the latter. Within militias, the greater the
degree of control over a militia, the lower the risk of using it.
Yet, if the state cannot be held accountable for the actions of militias (or the regular
forces, for that matter), then the point may be rendered moot. Put di↵erently, human
rights violations by militias may produce di↵erent amounts of liability in di↵erent states.
The key, I argue, is whether the state could be held accountable for the actions of irregular
forces, and thus militias would be a greater liability than otherwise. Internationally, the
work of Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell (2015) shows that geographic proximity to democracies
decreases the likelihood of a militia being active, since it would allow for more monitoring by
the international community that is concerned with human rights. Domestically, I posit, it
would fall upon the judiciary to punish the executive for a militia’s human rights violations.
42
3.1.1 Exacerbating Militia Liability: The Role of the Judiciary
As was argued above, the presence of various security threats is fertile grounds for the use
of militias, since they may be more cost-e↵ective than the regular forces. However, not
all states experiencing security threats use militias, and those that do use them do not
necessarily use them all the time. A key factor, I argue, is how accountable the state can
be made regarding the actions of the militias, and domestically this greatly depends on how
powerful the judiciary is.
First, a strong and independent judiciary would be able to rule against the state and
hold it accountable for the actions of militias. The fact that leaders could be potentially
convicted for human rights violations because of abuses committed by either force would
encourage them to keep strict controls over its forces or even dissuade them from using
militias altogether.
Second, even in cases in which the link between a militia and the state is held secret, they
still represent a liability inasmuch a highly independent and e↵ective judiciary correlates with
a higher chance that connections between militias and the state would be drawn, despite
e↵orts to keep them clandestine, as access to courts and investigative e↵orts ramp up with
judicial quality.
Indeed, if victims, their families or NGOs are able to blow the whistle, then the judicial
branch would be able to punish the executive and the military for the use of militias. In
Colombia, dozens of politicians and senior military o cers have been convicted for their ties
to the AUC. In Spain, security o cials and a former minister were accused for the actions
of the GAL and tried, despite their e↵ort to keep the so-called dirty war against the Basque
separatists secret. I would thus expect that the greater judicial independence is the less
likely a militia is to be used. Thus, the greater the power of the judiciary, the less likely we
are to see a state using militias.
Our first hypothesis is thus:
Hypothesis 3.1: The greater the strength of the judiciary the less likely a state will use
a militia.
However, the greater the security threat, the more likely that this calculus changes in favor
of using militias. In particular, I have argued that rebel groups represent a threat that the
regular forces may not be able to face directly more e↵ectively than in tandem with irregular
forces. As was discussed above, militias might present the state with several advantages: they
are a cheap option for reinforcing their regular forces, which may be stretched thin as is, and
the former typically have more autonomy, which allow them to be quick and flexible in their
deployment and activity (Bo¨hmelt and Clayton, 2018). In addition, militias are identified
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in the literature as having better local information than the regular forces, which allows
for better navigating the geography and the populace and thus root out rebel member and
collaborators. Militias thus counter the rebel’s information asymmetry advantage (Carey,
Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015; Biberman, 2018).
Our second hypothesis is therefore:
Hypothesis 3.2: Militias are more likely to be used by states experiencing civil war than
by those that are not.
The impact of civil war and judicial strength are not independent from one another,
according to the theory. Indeed, the state always considers a security-liability trade-o↵,
which is also determined by how much importance is given to the good and the bad. Recall
from chapter 2 that the appearance of a threat would make security more salient for the
state relative to liability, and that an increase in the salience of security favors the use of
the force that produces the most liability relative to security. In addition, I concluded that,
under most circumstances, said force would be the militia.
Thus, not only do civil wars make militias more likely to be used in and of itself, but also
change how states assess the impact of the risk of using militias. In this sense, I expect that
civil war will moderate the e↵ect of a strong judiciary on the likelihood of using militias.
This leads us to our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.3: The impact of a strong judiciary on the use of militias is moderated
by the presence of civil war.
Finally, the amount of control the state has over a militia matters: the more autonomous
the militia is from the state, the more likely it is to become a liability, as was explained
above. As such, we should expect that states are less willing to use the more autonomous
militias the stronger the judiciary becomes. If the state has more control over the militias,
then the impact of the judiciary’s strength shouldn’t matter as much because the state can
keep these militias in line. Thus, a strong judiciary should decrease the likelihood of using
very autonomous militias more than it decreases the likelihood of using less autonomous
ones.
Our final hypothesis is thus:
Hypothesis 3.4: As judicial strength increases, a state is more likely to use a militia
over which it has greater control than to use a more autonomous militia.
Note that the economic theory of pro-government militias produces a di↵erent empirical
expectation than that of the ‘delegation of atrocities’ view. According to the former, we
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should expect less militia use the more a state can be held accountable, but according to the
latter the greater the accountability the greater the incentive of states to use militias in order
to shift responsibility for human rights violations away from them. Testing the hypotheses
presented above will thus allow for assessing both arguments.
3.2 Research Design
To test these hypotheses, I will perform logistic regressions on cross-national data from 1981
to 2007 to zone in on which countries are the ones more likely to use militias. The unit of
analysis is thus the country-year. As this test portends to assess a theory that competes
with what is found in the literature, for comparability’s sake I will use Carey, Colaresi and
Mitchell’s (2015) as the baseline for this study and incorporate the key elements that the
discussion above has shown.
Indeed, the above-mentioned paper is one of the main showcases of the plausible deniabil-
ity argument: their main finding is that the more a state depends on aid from democracies,
the more likely it is to use informal militias. This way, the authors argue, aid-dependent
states can continue to violate human rights through militias, while maintaining a good stand-
ing with donors and thus not put aid flows at risk. By focusing on the judiciary, I push for
a critical test of the plausible deniability argument and my own.
The main dataset to be used is the Pro-Government Militia Database (PGMD) by Carey,
Mitchell and Lowe (2013), whose data availability defines our period of study, 1981-2007.
This dataset provides us with a dummy variable that tells us whether a PGM was active
in a given country in a given year. The authors define a PGM as “a group that 1. is
identified as pro-government or sponsored by the government (national or subnational), 2.
is identified as not being part of the regular security forces, 3. is armed, and 4. has some
level of organization” (Carey, Mitchell and Lowe, 2013, p. 250).
The dataset also tells us what type of link the government has to militias: an o cial,
openly declared link, or an informal, sometimes even clandestine link. Carey, Mitchell and
Lowe (2013) call the PGMs with the first type of link semi-o cial and the ones with the
second type informal. Examples of semi-o cial PGMs are the National Guard (United
States), the Revolutionary Guard (Iran), the Village Defense Committees (India), and the
Rondas Campesinas (Peru). Examples of informal PGMs are the United Self-Defense Forces
of Colombia, the Janjaweed Militia (Sudan), the Anti-Aceh Separatist Front (Indonesia),
and the Interahamwe Militia (Rwanda).
The type of link is useful here inasmuch it allows us to proxy for control over the militia,
as semi-o cial PGMs are much more articulated with the state than informal ones, and as
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such the latter tend to be more autonomous than the former (Carey, Mitchell and Lowe,
2013; Bo¨hmelt and Clayton, 2018). Indeed, a quick look throughout the cases in the PGMD
shows that for most semi-o cial PGMs their only source of funding is the government1.
Based on this, we have two dependent variables: semi-o cial or informal PGM active
(dummy variable) in a country in a given year. By using the two, it will be possible to analyze
just how much are states willing to use militias and with what degree of control. Moreover,
di↵erentiating between semi-o cial and informal PGMs will allow for a comparison with
studies that portray the use of militias as the delegation of atrocities, since they typically
focus on the informal ones.
I will assume that the state has more control over semi-o cial PGMs than over informal
ones. This is not far-fetched: the first are more incorporated into the state apparatus than
the latter. Moreover, the latter may actually be working in a clandestine fashion, which
could give them more leeway in how they provide security and thus exacerbate the liability
problem. As such, I expect that liability concerns stemming from judiciary strength are
more important for informal than semi-o cial PGMs, as the state can impose restraint on
the latter if need be, but less likely so on the former. By comparing both regressions we can
test for hypothesis 3.4.
The two other main variables of interest are the strength of the judiciary and civil war. To
operationalize the first, I use Linzer and Staton’s (2015) index of judicial independence. This
index aims at capturing de facto judicial independence, which refers to the extent to which
judges are, in practice, autonomous from external influence (including the government’s) in
their decision-making and how likely are their decisions to be implemented. This captures,
in the end, just how powerful the judiciary is, which matches well with what we wish to test.
The index is an interval measure from 0 (lowest independence) to 1 (highest independence),
which was constructed by the authors using a latent variable estimation from eight existing
indicators on the topic. As such, it allows for cross-sectional, time-series analysis to be done.
An issue could be raised that the level of judicial independence is endogenous to conflict
inasmuch leaders could restrict liberties to deal with their opposition, or that perhaps there
is conflict because of concessions made by leaders to increase the strength of democratic
institutions. However, as Epperly and Sievert (2018) show, conflicts do not have a deter-
ministic e↵ect on institutions, but rather it could go either way. In other words, conflict is a
critical juncture: whether judicial independence increases or decreases is context-sensitive.
Given this, I take it as exogenous for our purposes. As figure 3.3, there is ample variation
in judicial independence in countries with and without civil war.
As for civil war, I follow Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell (2015) and use the UCDP/PRIO
1Bo¨hmelt and Clayton (2018) explore this to some extent.
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Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD Gleditsch et al., 2002). The ACD defines an internal armed
conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where
the use of armed forces between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths [and
it] occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition group” (Gleditsch et al.,
2002, pp. 618-619). Based on the intensity of a conflict (the number of battle-related deaths),
it is categorized as minor, intermediate or civil war. For our purposes, I take the presence of
internal conflict with at least 25 battle-related deaths as the presence of civil war (our main
conflict variable), and use a dummy variable to indicate the intensity of the civil war, that
is, for civil wars have at least a thousand battle-related deaths per year (i.e., the highest
category of intensity)2.
In addition, Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell (2015) use the other indicators of domestic
unrest: strikes, riots, demonstrations and guerrilla attacks. These are dummy variables
based on the Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) dataset (Banks, 2008).
Given that the theory leads us to expect that security needs will only result in militia
use if liability is low enough, and that civil war should moderate the e↵ect of the strength of
the judiciary, I interact the index of judicial independence with the civil war dummy. In this
sense, I expect that judicial independence will matter less when civil war is present. Also,
in accordance to hypothesis 3.4, the e↵ect of judicial independence should matter less for
semi-o cial PGMs than for informal ones.
Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell (2015) capture international accountability by creating a
measure of aid dependence from democracies and another for trade aid dependence from
autocracies. These are the natural logarithms of the total aid received from democracies and
autocracies, respectively, divided by the recipient’s GDP. In addition, they use distance to
nearest democracy to capture monitoring costs from the international community. I will use
these measures as the international sources of liability in PGM use.
To control for each country’s particular characteristics, I again build from Carey, Co-
laresi and Mitchell (2015). They use the natural logarithms of GDP and population (taken,
respectively, from the Penn World Tables and the Correlates of War project), and ethnic
fractionalization from Fearon and Laitin (2003). Using GDP and ethnic fractionalization
also have a clear connection to the theory. Based on the model, we would expect that the
greater the GDP the more likely a state would use PGMs. In addition, recall the discussion
about a PGM’s information advantage relative to the regular forces. The more ethnically
diverse a society, the more likely that using militias would allow states to better navigate
2Running the models with the intensity dummy as the main conflict variable (that is, interacting the
judicial independence with the indicator of high-intensity civil wars rather than minor conflicts) does not
significantly change the results.
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the civilian population.
The Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2010) score is used to characterize regime
type. Since the authors show that PGMs are more likely to be present in anocracies (i.e.,
that the variable has a non-linear e↵ect), I also use the squared term of the polity score. The
polity score must be used carefully since one of its components is used in the construction of
the Linzer and Staton (2015) index. However, these indicators have a low correlation, which
should ease any multicollinearity concerns we may have, and there is variation in judicial
independence across regime types, regardless of whether or not a country experiences civil
war, as figure ?? shows. Finally, as a robustness check, I also use random e↵ects to account
for unit heterogeneity. Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics.
Figure 3.1: Judicial Ind. Across Regimes, With and Without Civil War
3.3 Results
Table 3.2 presents the regression results. As can be seen across the models, judicial indepen-
dence negatively impacts the likelihood of having an active PGM, whether semi-o cial or
informal. This is true regardless of whether we include the polity indexes or not. Moreover,
since the polity score does not seem to be significant across models, it would seem to be
evidence that what matters is not how democratic a state is across the board, but rather
how much can the judiciary hold the executive accountable for the actions of regular and
irregular troops.
In addition, civil war is significant across the models, except number 3. The interaction
between judicial independence and civil war, however, is positive and significant in all but
model 2. It would thus seem that the e↵ect of judicial independence on using a PGM depends
on the presence of civil war. This supports our hypotheses: not only is a threat to security
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DV: Semi-o cial PGM 0.2901 0.4539 0 1
DV: Informal PGM 0.2115 0.4084 0 1
Judicial Independence 0.4485 0.2947 0.0162 0.9909
Civil war 0.2974 0.4572 0 1
 25 battle-rel. deaths
CW intensity 0.1141 0.3181 0 1
 1000 battle-rel. deaths
Strikes 0.1350 0.3419 0 1
Riots 0.1870 0.3900 0 1
Demonstrations 0.3071 0.4614 0 1
Guerrilla attacks 0.2026 0.4020 0 1
Polity2 1.9845 6.9040 -10 10
Ln Democratic aid -0.0278 4.5014 -8.5172 7.4953
Autocratic aid -7.2485 3.1363 -8.5172 3.3822
Distance to democracy 885.3856 1014.846 0 4985.35
Ln GDP 8.3710 1.1649 5.0333 10.7297
Ln population 9.6750 1.3703 7.1951 14.0827
Ethnic fractionalization 0.4359 0.2875 0.0050 0.9250
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Table 3.2: Determinants of PGM Activity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Semio cial Informal Semiof. (RE) Inf. (RE)
Judicial independence -2.412⇤ -3.375⇤ -7.691⇤ -3.870⇤
(0.588) (0.656) (1.781) (1.126)
Jud. indep. x Civil war 2.397⇤ 0.859 8.141⇤ 1.690+
(0.517) (0.578) (1.960) (0.877)
Civil war 0.785⇤ 0.847⇤ -0.399 0.639+
(  25 battle-rel. deaths) (0.260) (0.266) (0.567) (0.373)
CW intensity 0.328 0.419⇤ 0.413 1.049⇤
(  1000 battle-rel. deaths) (0.215) (0.200) (0.340) (0.282)
Strikes -0.132 0.0280 0.208 0.0977
(0.205) (0.197) (0.344) (0.257)
Riots -0.200 0.436⇤ -0.389 0.294
(0.186) (0.178) (0.309) (0.224)
Demonstrations -0.285+ 0.191 0.349 0.231
(0.167) (0.165) (0.270) (0.208)
Guerrilla Attacks 0.475⇤ 0.228 0.551+ -0.00687
(0.171) (0.168) (0.288) (0.224)
Polity2 0.0403+ 0.145⇤ 0.0182 0.173⇤
(0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0466) (0.0324)
Polity2 sq. 0.00788⇤ 0.00262 -0.00686 0.000956
(0.00348) (0.00369) (0.00746) (0.00559)
Democratic aid 0.183⇤ 0.0892⇤ -0.0232 0.0802
(0.0270) (0.0302) (0.0735) (0.0555)
Autocratic aid -0.0270 -0.0407⇤ -0.0767⇤ -0.0738⇤
(0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0331) (0.0269)
Distance to democracy -0.000727⇤ -0.000695⇤ -0.000404 -0.00135⇤
(0.000166) (0.000172) (0.000301) (0.000266)
Distance x dem. aid 1.164⇤ 0.940⇤ 1.068⇤ 1.557⇤
(0.187) (0.185) (0.399) (0.290)
Ln GDP 1.045⇤ 0.0965 2.123⇤ -0.361
(0.109) (0.107) (0.474) (0.274)
Ln population 0.397⇤ 0.187⇤ 2.108⇤ 0.508⇤
(0.0518) (0.0527) (0.531) (0.188)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.184 -0.0501 1.275 -0.263
(0.257) (0.255) (2.346) (0.920)
Constant -20.53⇤ -9.337⇤ -46.96⇤ -12.59⇤
(1.629) (1.486) (7.109) (3.048)
N 1866 1866 1866 1866
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.10, ⇤ p < 0.05
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required to use a PGM, the risk of using it must be minimized so as to avoid it becoming a
liability.
However, as the coe cient of the interaction suggests, the presence of civil war seems to
eliminate the impact of judicial independence on the likelihood of using semi-o cial PGMs.
This is in accordance to hypothesis 3.4: civil war makes the use of PGMs more likely, and
since semi-o cial PGMs are more controlled by the government, then they can be used with
lower risk than informal ones to respond to the security situation when judicial independence
is high.
The results regarding ethnic fractionalization indicate that it does not seem to matter
how ethnically diverse the country is for a PGM to be used. This may be an artifact of
the aggregation of the data, however, so further study here is necessary. As for budget
considerations, there is mixed evidence: the e↵ect of Ln GDP is positive and statistically
significant in models 1 and 3, positive but not significant in model 2, and negative but not
significant in model 4. It seems to be the case that, in line with Bo¨hmelt and Clayton (2018),
that wealthier states use semi-o cial PGMs more than informal ones. Further research is
required, however, as GDP may be capturing a country’s capabilities and military quality,
which, according to our model, make it less likely for a PGM to be used3.
A di↵erent possibility, however, is that the costs of informal PGMs are paid in some
other form, which is not reflected on a country’s GDP. As the PGMD shows, many informal
PGMs are financed by businessmen and landowners, or they finance themselves through
extortion, looting and pillaging, and illegal trade (drugs in particular). As will be shown
in the next chapter, these types of financing are basically allowing the PGM to tax the
population directly, rather than the state increasing taxes and then paying the PGM, or
foregoing taxation on illegal trade because it could become a liability. Moreover, these types
of financing would mean that the PGMs themselves become more of a liability, since they
could overtax, pillage without control, and boost the drug trade and its inherent health,
social and security problems.
Finally, regarding Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell’s (2015) original results, what hold is that
the more democratic aid a state receives and the more distant the nearest democracy is from
it the more likely the state will use a PGM. These results can also be explained using the
economic theory of PGMs: first, the more resources you have (aid received), the more likely
you use PGMs. Second, the more distant democracies are from a state, the less surveillance
they can have over the latter, and thus the less riskier it is to use PGMs (less liability).
However, autocratic aid, as in their original results, is negative and significant across the
3Recall the budget discussion in the theory chapter regarding the di culty of translating resources from
theory to empirics while holding all else equal.
51
board. This is puzzling: according to the theory herein it should have a positive e↵ect (just
like democratic aid). That being said, subsequent tests (see table 3.3 below) shows that
autocratic aid is not significant for the first use of PGMs.
To explore the substantive e↵ect of judicial independence, I use Stata’s margins command
based on models 1 and 2 and plot the results. All variables except for our index of interest
and civil war are set to the mean, and the dummy variables and polity score are set to zero
(the center of the scale). I chose to focus on the anocracies for the simulation (i.e., states
that are in the middle of the polity2 scale) because they have been identified in the literature
as the more likely to use informal militias (Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015), and thus
constitute a good case to explore whether or not it is the strength of democracy across the
board or the strength of the judiciary.
Two types of simulations are then run for each of the two dependent variables. The first
type analyzes the case where the state is not experiencing a civil war and the second analyzes
the case where there is a civil war present with at least 25, but less than 1000, battle-related
deaths4 Figure 3.2 shows the results.
As can be seen, PGMs of any type are much more likely to be present when there
is low judicial independence and the state is experiencing civil war. The e↵ect of civil
war, moreover, is highest at the smaller values of judicial independence for informal PGMs.
Indeed, at the extremes values of judicial independence the presence of civil war does not
seem to have too big of an impact on the probability of informal PGM activity. Rather, the
e↵ect is largest between the lower end and the middle.
Interestingly, the probability of having an informal PGM falls faster than the probability
of having a semi-o cial PGM the more judicial independence grows. Moreover, the presence
of civil war virtually eliminates the e↵ect of judicial independence on semi-o cial militias,
which provides support for hypothesis 3.4. This further shows that states are not willing to
run the risk of having very autonomous armed groups outside their regular forces the more
they can be held accountable for their behavior. On the other hand, states usually have
more control over semi-o cial PGMs, which minimizes the risk of agency loss and as such
are likely to be seen in states that are experiencing civil war, regardless of how strong their
judiciary is.
3.3.1 Judicial Independence Across Regimes
To further explore the e↵ect of judicial independence, I also run the simulations while varying
the polity2 score. This way, we can get a hold of the e↵ect of increasing accountability on
4Simulating for only civil wars above the 1000 battle-related deaths threshold does not change the results)
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Figure 3.2: Substantive E↵ects of Judicial Independence
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the executive throughout regimes (recall that the simulations for figure 3.2 uses a polity2
score of zero). Figure3.3 shows the results.
As can be seen, the judiciary seems to have no e↵ect over the probability of having semi-
o cial PGMs active in civil war (although it seems to be more likely that weak and strong
democracies use them than autocracies). On the other hand, the greater the polity2 score,
the more likely a state will use an informal PGM, especially when judicial independence is
low. It would thus seem to be the case that what matters is whether the executive can be
held accountable, not which type of regime it is.
That being said, it is interesting to note that autocracies, both weak and strong, are less
likely to use informal militias (though civil war does seem to bring them out, regardless).
It would seem to be that the calculus of an autocrat is di↵erent: either they have no need
for one, or arming a group outside of the regular forces over which they have little control
is deemed as far too risky. This resonates with De Bruin’s (2018) study, in which she shows
that using militias as a coup-proofing strategy might actually trigger coups, as the military
are either deprived of extra resources (which go into militias) or they anticipate the militias’
strengthening and launch the coup before it is too late.
A critique might be made that the e↵ect of judicial independence is non-linear. Using
the index and its squared term do not significantly change the results: the maximum is at
the lower ends of the index, and the 95% confidence intervals so wide that the actual e↵ect
could just be a small plateau at the beginning of the index or simply indistinguishable from
the linear specification.
3.3.2 Militias as ‘Failure Events’
The results shown above present evidence for our expectations regarding security needs and
liability minimization. However, temporal dynamics have not yet been taken into account.
Indeed, it may be the case that there are PGMs already in play before a civil war begins.
To explore this, I use event-history modeling.
I recode the dependent variables as multiple failure events: they are zero when there
is no PGM active and one only the first time they are active after an absence spell. The
duration of their activity is treated as censored (that is, these countries leave the data pool).
In addition, I use time polynomials to control for time dependencies. These polynomials
start on the first year of observation and end on failure event. If a country re-enters the data
pool (PGMs go from active to absent), then the time variables restart. Results are shown in
table 3.3.
Although judicial independence is negative in all models, it is only statistically significant
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Figure 3.3: Judicial Independence Across Regimes
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Table 3.3: Determinants of First PGM Use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Semio cial Informal Semiof. (RE) Inf. (RE)
Judicial independence -0.494 -2.708+ -1.444 -2.994+
(1.319) (1.401) (2.023) (1.574)
Jud. indep. x Civil war 1.734 1.244 2.740 1.809
(1.083) (1.242) (1.682) (1.421)
Civil war 0.951+ 0.816 1.216+ 0.710
(  25 battle-rel. deaths) (0.561) (0.500) (0.716) (0.552)
CW intensity 0.0541 0.456 -0.314 0.637
(  1000 battle-rel. deaths) (0.426) (0.392) (0.509) (0.432)
Strikes -0.163 -0.265 -0.159 -0.174
(0.465) (0.386) (0.545) (0.410)
Riots -0.442 0.840⇤ -0.502 0.748⇤
(0.427) (0.324) (0.488) (0.346)
Demonstrations 0.106 0.356 0.328 0.348
(0.358) (0.330) (0.403) (0.349)
Guerrilla Attacks 0.0864 -0.385 0.265 -0.426
(0.356) (0.346) (0.409) (0.370)
Polity2 0.0141 0.0721 -0.0260 0.0837
(0.0492) (0.0477) (0.0684) (0.0517)
Polity2 sq. 0.00644 0.00596 -0.00147 0.00595
(0.00747) (0.00739) (0.0104) (0.00804)
Ln GDP 0.483⇤ -0.132 0.592 -0.264
(0.229) (0.207) (0.367) (0.268)
Ln population 0.265⇤ 0.0869 0.474⇤ 0.145
(0.128) (0.0950) (0.214) (0.133)
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.339 0.348 -0.661 0.304
(0.593) (0.480) (1.013) (0.635)
Autocratic aid -0.0370 -0.0483 -0.0573 -0.0510
(0.0407) (0.0371) (0.0463) (0.0388)
Democratic aid 0.143⇤ 0.147⇤ 0.111 0.149+
(0.0604) (0.0719) (0.0830) (0.0791)
Distance to democracy -0.000179 -0.000483 0.000304 -0.000602
(0.000291) (0.000323) (0.000430) (0.000373)
Distance x dem. aid 0.610 0.745+ 0.169 0.868⇤
(0.380) (0.396) (0.540) (0.442)
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.10, ⇤ p < 0.05
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Table 3.3 (continued): Determinants of First PGM Use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Semio cial Informal Semiof. (RE) Inf. (RE)
Time to PGM 0.452⇤ 0.0827 0.823⇤ 0.179
(0.211) (0.168) (0.265) (0.187)
Time to PGM sq. -0.0651⇤ -0.0103 -0.0907⇤ -0.0163
(0.0255) (0.0173) (0.0290) (0.0186)
Time to PGM cubed 0.00176⇤ 0.000369 0.00229⇤ 0.000522
(0.000773) (0.000483) (0.000850) (0.000514)
Constant -14.09⇤ -8.105⇤ -15.86⇤ -8.794⇤
(3.355) (3.102) (4.957) (3.539)
N 1374 1551 1374 1551
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.10, ⇤ p < 0.05
in models 2 and 4 (first informal PGM use). This points to domestic accountability being
the main obstacle for the use of informal PGMs. In terms of our model, it would be the
main driver of the liability parameter.
The presence of civil war, on the other hand, has a positive and statistically significant
e↵ect on the first use of semi-o cial PGMs, regardless of judicial independence. According
to these results, states are willing to tap into the military advantages that militia provide
as long as they are able to control them (i.e., minimize the risk of their use). Combined
with the results on informal PGMs, the issue of control over them for risk minimization, and
therefore their viability, hinges on domestic accountability.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presented a cross-national test of the economic theory of Pro-Government
Militias. Using data on PGMs around the world between 1981 and 2007, as well as civil
war and judicial independence data, it has shown that countries with low levels of judicial
independence that are experiencing civil war are the most likely to have militias active within
their borders.
It has also shown that the e↵ect of security needs on the state’s decision to use militias
hinges on how much it can be held accountable domestically. Indeed, the positive e↵ect of
civil war on the likelihood of militia use is highest at the lower levels of judicial strength.
This goes against the conventional wisdom, that militias do the dirty work that the regular
forces cannot, because from that logic we would actually expect there to be more incentives
to delegate atrocities the stronger the judiciary.
Moreover, the e↵ect of judicial independence determines which type of militia is used: the
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survival analysis has shown that informal PGMs are less likely when judicial independence
is high, regardless of the presence of civil war. However, this e↵ect is virtually eliminated for
semi-o cial PGMs when civil war is present. It thus seems that states do take advantages of
militias, but they only use the more autonomous ones (i.e., informal PGMs) when domestic
accountability is low so as to minimize risk.
Finally, it has also shown that judicial independence only hinders the first appearance of
informal PGMs, whereas semi-o cial PGMs seem to be una↵ected. It would thus seem to
be the case that states are only willing to use armed groups outside their regular forces if
they can have enough control over them given increasing levels of domestic accountability.
Overall, the evidence presented in this chapter supports the theory. In particular, it
supports one of main implications of the theory: that the use of militias hinges not only
on security needs but also on minimizing risk (i.e. balancing the good and the bad). What
this also means is that the critique of the ‘plausible deniability’ argument is warranted. I
have argued that both theories have opposite expectations regarding the level of domestic
accountability, and the results favor the economic theory of PGMs.
That being said, the results by Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell (2015) seem to hold: the
more democratic aid a country receives and the further away it is from democracies the
more likely it is to use militias. From my theory, this could be explained by the fact that the
greater the budget the more likely a state will use PGMs, and that liability is lower when the
international community cannot make proper surveillance. However, the fact that autocratic
aid has a negative e↵ect is puzzling, since it should, according to the model herein, have a
positive e↵ect (budget changes). Further study on both international accountability and the
impact of changes in resources is needed.
Along the same lines, further study is necessary for investigating the model’s full impli-
cations. Expanding the PGMD and incorporating variables that better isolate and capture
budgetary constraints, as well as salience changes and more disaggregated security data,
would be an ideal way forward. Indeed, in this chapter the theory has been used to assess
under what circumstances would a state use a PGM, but the theory also allows for under-
standing how the forces are combined. Indeed, one may be able to see how the use of the
PGM varies in intensity after the state decides to employ them, both temporally and across
its regions.
The evidence shown herein implies that if the international community wishes to posi-
tively impact a state’s human rights record, then it is not enough for it to be international
monitoring, but rather the bolstering of domestic accountability measures. In particular,
ensuring that the judiciary branch has the strength to constrain the executive and hold it
accountable seems to be what makes states reticent of using informal PGMs. In this sense,
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since dependence on aid from democracies is correlated with informal PGMs being active
(Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015), then further aid conditionality having to do with good
governance and constraints on the executive (especially from the judiciary) would pave the
way for the state to build up its security forces in such a way that it minimizes human rights
violations.
Indeed, as Stanton (2015) shows, it is not necessarily true that all militias victimize
civilians, so the policy implication is not about how to make states not use militias, but
rather which ones not to use, and how to ensure that they toe the line. If the state is held
to high human rights standards, then it will be more likely to use militias that it can control
so that they show restraint. After all, states find in militias an interesting addition to their
security apparatus since their low costs, autonomy and informational advantages allow for
an easy bolstering of security.
Chapter 4
Combining Forces: Force
Substitutability in Civil War
Introduction
Once a state decides to use irregular forces, how does it combine them with its regular forces?
In particular, what does force deployment look like on the ground? Most of the literature has
focused on analyzing which type of states use PGMs and under what general circumstances.
Few works have actually explored militia deployment and activity subnationally. From a
few exceptions, we know that militias appear in areas in which the state and the rebels
are at a military stalemate (Jentzsch, 2014), that they operate near military bases (Mazzei,
2009), and that the state is more likely to use militias in conflict regions where there are also
military purges in progress (Eck, 2015).
However, the trade-o↵ inherent to the substitution of forces has of yet not been addressed
in the literature. As we know from the foreign policy substitutability literature, ignoring
substitution among policies can lead to confounding, as “similar factors could lead to distinct
concrete or empirical (...) policy responses” (Most and Starr, 1984, p. 387).
Indeed, although the literature has analyzed some of the characteristics of states that
would be more likely to use militias, we do not understand how states change their engage-
ments given militia activity. From anecdotal evidence, most arguments regarding militia
deployment seem not to take into account force substitution. Most works simply assume
that militias are prompted in addition to the armed forces and, in particular, do their ‘dirty
work’. What the economic theory of PGMs tells us is that to start using (or increase the
use of) one force, the state must spend less on the other, even if their roles are clearly
di↵erentiated.
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Based on the model, the distribution of resources between regular and irregular forces
is in proportion to the net utility gain that each produces. The combination of forces is
thus based on this. As the proportion changes, holding the budget constant, so too must
the allocation of resources. In other words, what we should expect is a substitution e↵ect:
the higher the resource amount allocated to one force the lower the amount allocated to
the other. This can be understood both at the national (aggregate) and subnational levels:
we can think of the budget as being divided into smaller budgets, one for each region of
the country, and then distributed between regular and irregular forces depending on the
security/liability calculus of each scenario.
To test this expectation, I use data from the most recent Colombian civil war to study
the patterns of activity of the Colombian Armed Forces given the activity of the United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, hereinafter AUC), an
illegal armed group that harassed and killed thousands of civilians and colluded with army
o cials and politicians at the local, regional and national level during their active period.
This chapter is organized as follows. The first section explores force substitutability
based on the model and presents the empirical implication to be tested. The second section
presents an overview of the Colombian experience with militias. The third section presents
the research design. The fourth section presents and discusses the results of the empirical
analysis. Finally, the fifth section presents the concluding remarks and discusses potential
future research.
4.1 Force Substitutability
We know from the literature and the PGMD that not all states use militias, and those
that do use them do not do so all the time. Thus, whatever triggers the appearance of a
militia in a country may not do so in another. In civil wars, for example, not all states use
militias to battle insurgents, and among those that do there is variation in the timing and
the type they use. As Most and Starr (1984, p. 387) argue, since a given stimulus may make
some leaders adopt policy x while other would adopt policy y, “an understanding of which
particular [policy] would be adopted by di↵erent decision makers under di↵erent conditions
would involve a consideration of how they make comparisons across, and eventually choose
from, the range of those available options”.
It is thus important to understand policy decisions in the light of what is the particular
objective sought and why states allocate resources as they do across possible policies to be
implemented, given the constraints each state faces. Indeed, as Palmer and Morgan (2006)
show, in pursuing objectives and using di↵erent policies, given budgetary constraints, states
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face trade-o↵s between the pursuit of said objectives, and choosing among policies reflects
this.
Based on our model, if the state decides to use a PGM, then it is accepting two trade-o↵s:
the first is between gaining some security in exchange for some risk (liability) inherent to
the use of militias, and the second is between spending all resources on the regular forces or
dividing them between the regular and irregular forces. What is the optimal combination of
forces for the government? Recall from chapter 2 that the amounts spent into each of the
forces is given by equations 2.16 and 2.17:
Ir =
(b+ 1)(A↵1   B↵2)  (A 1   B 2)
(A↵1   B↵2) + (A 1   B 2)
Ii =
(b+ 1)(A 1   B 2)  (A↵1   B↵2)
(A↵1   B↵2) + (A 1   B 2)
Which allow us to analyze how changes in any and all parameters would influence how
resources are (re)distributed among forces. What they also imply is that when the budget
is completely spent, allocating more resources to one force necessarily means taking some
from the amount allocated to the other. In other words, if the budget remains the same,
then changes in the parameters means spending more on one force and less on the other.
This can be better seen through equation 2.15:
Ii + 1
Ir + 1
=
A 1   B 2
A↵1   B↵2
The right-hand side of the equation compares the net e ciency with which each force
contributes to the utility, and the ratio between how much is spent on each force reflects
this comparison. Thus, as the right-hand side increases the irregular forces become relatively
more e cient at providing utility to the state and so more resources should be spent on them.
Assuming that the whole budget has been previously allocated and remains unchanged, an
increase in the net e ciency of the irregular forces means a spending less on the regular
ones, and vice-versa.
To better understand how the state combines its forces, we can apply the model’s logic
to sub-national units. For each region, the state will devote a given amount of resources to
face rebels. The amount of security that each force produces depends on the characteristics
and conflict dynamics of each region. Recall, for example, that PGMs have an informational
advantage relative to the regular forces, which may make them a better asset in regions
where the rebels are suspected to be hiding among the populace or receive support from
them. On the other hand, the regular forces may be better equipped for frontal assaults
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against the rebels.
However, how much liability each force produces also depends on where they are deployed.
For example, if the state does not have much control over militias, then it may be very
dangerous to use them in places where the state would rather minimize collateral damage
and civilian victimization. Likewise, if there is a risk of a coup, then the deployment of forces
near the seat of power should favor militias in order to coup-proof.
In addition, the salience of security and liability will di↵er throughout the national ter-
ritory. For example, we should expect security to be more salient relative to liability as the
value of a region increases because losing said region to the rebels could deprive the state
from profits and strategic positions for continuing the fight. On the other hand, a region
in which media access and reporting is higher may imply that the state would care more
about liability since its constituents could be paying more attention to human rights viola-
tions in it. In sum, we can use the model to not only identify how the state distributes its
resources between regular and irregular forces at the aggregate level, but also how resources
are allocated to each force in specific sub-national settings.
That being said, exploring this empirically may be particularly di cult because many
of the variables that we could use in our operationalization may actually capture multiple
concepts at the same time. For example, we could use the regional GDP as a proxy for
the budget constraint, but the size of the regional GDP may also represent how important
a region is for the government, as protecting or re-taking a very productive or rich region
would be prioritized relative to economically smaller regions.
Along the same lines, the liability that a PGM may produce in a given region would be
smaller the further away from the capital it is. This is for two reasons: on the one hand, the
more distant it is from the seat of power, the more likely that the region is less important
and thus any issues caused by the PGM are minimized. On the other, it is likely that the
media and NGOs would be more likely to blow the whistle on human rights violations, and
thus try to hold the state accountable for the militia’s activity, the closer a region is to the
capital.
What we can actually do to test the theory in a simple way is to directly compare the
state’s resource allocation among its available forces. In other words, rather than analyzing
the determinants of PGM presence by region, we can analyze the impact the allocation of
resources to PGMs has on the allocation of resources to regular forces, given that the state
has already made the security-liability calculus of whether or not to use the PGM.
However, assessing budgetary issues directly may not be particularly feasible, since it
may be information that is di cult (if not impossible) to get. Indeed, throughout the world
many of the resources devoted to militias are given in a clandestine fashion, and are thus
63
di cult to track. Rather, for the purposes of this test it may be more useful to think about
Ir and Ii as how much each force is used in each specific scenario, since the more resources
go into one force the more activities that force should perform, all else equal.
Thus, we can test the model by analyzing the substitutability of forces in terms of how
active each force is. Given the limited resources, and assuming that these are translated into
force activity, we should expect that the more active a force is in a territory the less active
the other one should be.
Our hypothesis is thus:
Hypothesis 4.1: The level of activity of regular forces in a given region is negatively related
to the militia activity in it.
4.2 Case Study: The United Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia
To test this hypothesis I will use the case of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia or
AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), a PGM active during Colombia’s most recent civil
war. Although the Colombian case may seemingly be considered as quite unique, a deeper
look shows that, controlling for peculiar characteristics, we can learn much from it and
generalize whatever conclusions we may reach. Indeed, although Colombia has experienced
one of the longest civil wars, supported an informal PGM that seems to be quite powerful
and with a large membership compared to most others despite the state having a relatively
strong army and relatively stable democratic institutions (for a country experiencing civil
violence), many of the subnational dynamics of PGM activity resembles the experience of
others.
First, the activity of the AUC was closely tied to, and complemented, the military’s. As in
other Latin American countries, for example, the PGM’s operations were carried out in close
proximity to that of the regular forces of the state, which made cooperation between the army
and the PGM more fluid and allowed the latter to do the dirty work for the former (Mazzei,
2009). Indeed, although it was a very autonomous militia, it always depended on the state,
especially because, contrary to the rebel groups, it did not have an autonomous mobilization
base (Zelik, 2015). Moreover, Jacobo Grajales (2017) argues that the paramilitary groups
in Colombia were molded by the state’s intervention.
Second, although Colombia has had somewhat of a stable democracy despite its internal
conflict, the democratic situation and the institutional strength outside the main cities of the
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country resembles other cases in which there is a clear lack of governmental reach. As Ferna´n
Gonza´lez (2014) explains, the formation of the Colombian state has been an ongoing process
in which the state has slowly expanded (and continues to do so) its reach from the center
outward, and the quality of institutions within a region depends on how articulated said
region is with the center (socially, economically, etc.), and especially the type of relationship
established between the central and local authorities (conflict, negotiation, co-optation)1.
In this sense, democracy in Colombia’s periphery has been lacking, as local strongmen
are able to control political action as if it were a mild (or even strong) autocratic setting. It
is no wonder that when Colombians were allowed to directly elect their mayors and governors
the electoral contest was marred with bloodshed and clientelism (Romero, 2003).
Such unequal development in Colombia led to not only great economic disparity but also
to di↵erent levels of institutional strength and e↵ectiveness across regional and municipal
units. Ana Arjona (2016) argues that this is a key factor in explaining variation in armed
group governance during the Colombian civil war: the degree of control the rebels (or even
the AUC) were able to establish greatly depended on the community’s ability to peacefully
resist, which in turn was given by the quality of institutions, state-given or otherwise, already
present.
Along the same lines, the infiltration of state institutions by armed actors, the militias
in particular, prevented the success of democratic institutions (see the ‘parapolitics scandal’
below), and their control over criminal activity became such that during their demobilization
talks the militia commanders promised to ‘give back’ Medell´ın2 to the authorities if the former
failed to pacify it (Ronderos, 2014).
Finally, just as with many other PGMs around the world, the AUC’s main objective was
keeping the population in check, weed out insurgent collaborators and deny further rebel
incursions rather than being the tip of the spear against Colombia’s rebels (Romero, 2003;
Rangel, 2005). The following subsection briefly overviews the Colombian case.
4.2.1 On Colombia’s Paramilitary Experience
The AUC were a federation of illegal paramilitary groups that united under the leadership of
Carlos Castan˜o. They were active between 1997 and 2006, when they demobilized following
negotiations with the government. They were an informal PGM whose connection to the
government was clandestine. Indeed, many politicians and army o cers were tried and
1Indeed, most of Colombia’s civil wars have been about federalism vs. centralism.
2Medell´ın is the second largest city in Colombia, both in terms of population and GDP.
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sentenced because of their collusion with the paramilitary3. At their peak, they were 80% of
the size of FARC and three times the size of ELN, Colombia’s two largest insurgent groups
(Rangel, 2005). How did this federation of militias come to be?
The Road to the AUC
The AUC were not a unique phenomenon in Colombian history: in the period known as
La Violencia, in the mid-20th century, the so-called ‘pa´jaros’ (the birds), militias with ties
to the conservative party and local elites, emerged and terrorized the country-side, rooting
out suspected members and collaborators of the liberal insurgents. Later, during a state
of emergency, president Guillermo Leo´n Valencia authorized civilians to perform national
defense functions with the executive decree 2298 of 1965. This decree would later become a
law (Ley 48 of 1968), which allowed the army to provide civilians with arms and coordinate
assaults with them (Ronderos, 2014).
As will be shown, militias in Colombia have been a mostly rural phenomenon. This should
not be surprising: most rebellions in Colombia have also had an important rural component.
In a sense, most could be cast in terms of central Colombia vs. its periphery. Not only
that, regional elites, which held so much power that many regions had lacking democratic
institutions, were quick to put down any threat. The demand for security, along with the
regular forces usually being concentrated around the capital and the largest cities, made
rural Colombia a fertile place for militias, especially when rebels exploited their informational
advantage in the periphery.
However, paramilitaries in Colombia had a history of going back and forth between
legality and illegality. Regardless, the constant in this back and forth is collusion with
authorities, especially the army. Although the link to the state was always present (and
suspected, if not visible), it wasn’t until the late 1990s and early 2000s that army o cers
and politicians were punished for colluding with paramilitaries. In fact, as will be shown
below, the Colombian government was not punished for using militias by the international
community (not even by the US, which was very aware of the collusion); aid kept flowing.
In other words, the risk of using militias, especially in terms of accountability, was relatively
minor throughout the 20th century.
In Colombia’s most recent civil war, they appeared after the guerrilla movements started
to encroach into wealthier areas in the late 70s and early 80s (Duncan, 2015). They sprung
up as part of grass-roots movements, encouraged by regional elites and the support of the
3This was the so-called “parapolitics scandal” that started when investigative journalists and academi-
cians uncovered these links and then demobilized senior members of the AUC started to give incriminating
testimonials (Valencia, 2007).
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army, since in these times it was still legal for the army to provide weapons to civilians
(Duncan, 2014). In the beginning they were tasked with defensive and intelligence roles, as
their local knowledge provided them an advantage over the armed forces. As such, they were
a cheap way to aid the army. Later, however, with drug tra cking organizations becoming
entangled with the self-defense groups, they became more autonomous and began a dirty
war against the insurgents by victimizing individuals and communities suspected of being
members of or collaborating with FARC and ELN (Grajales, 2017).
Despite the existence of a legal framework, some of these organizations were clandestine
from the beginning: the first illegal self-defense groups in record date to 1986, but it is
clear that they had the help of army o cials to be prompted (Romero, 2003). During the
Turbay administration (1978-1982), for example, repression against civilians was intensified,
and a large part of this was done by an illegal group: the so-called Triple A (Anticommunist
American Action) was a short-lived militia that hunted down communists. Although it
was known that the Colombian Armed Forces were behind their creation, no o cer was
prosecuted (Zelik, 2015). Militias, thus, presented little or no chance of becoming a liability,
as collusion with them had no consequences for politicians nor army o cers.
As Romero (2003) explains, a combination of three factors enabled the formation of the
paramilitary organizations as we know them today in Colombia. First, the peace process
that the president Belisario Betancur started with guerrillas in the 1980s brought with it a
political reform that regional elites promptly rejected, which made the first popular elections
of mayors in Colombia a bloody contest. Second, the armed forces also rejected the peace
process and favored counterinsurgency tactics as the means to eliminate the rebel threat.
Finally, drug tra ckers started to prompt their own armed groups in order to compete with
FARC for the control of the narcotics business, and they mixed with the counterinsurgency
e↵ort. Yet, despite the friction between regional and local elites and the army, on one side,
and the government on the other, the latter barely took any action against militias nor the
o cers that helped to sire them.
The origin of paramilitarism empowered by drug money can be traced to the Muerte a
Secuestradores (Death to Kidnappers) group, or MAS (Echand´ıa, 2013). This group was
prompted by Colombia’s drug cartels after a guerrilla group kidnapped a member of the
Ochoa family, which was part of the Medell´ın cartel. However, the MAS exceeded its initial
purposes, and became a tool for the cartels’ territorial expansion. Indeed, Echand´ıa (2013)
argues that since then the expansion of paramilitary organizations in Colombia obeys drug-
tra cking interests. In this regard, the author continues, counterinsurgency was taken as
their rallying flag because it coincided with the competition in the drug business. After all,
rebels in Colombia, especially FARC, started to use drug tra cking to finance themselves and
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thus became competitors of the paramilitaries. Despite everything, Colombian authorities
(and especially the army) continued to collude with militias. As Rangel (2005) put it, the
state had to choose between the security problem created by the use of militias and the one
produced by the rebel groups’ activity Despite the risks, then, the state chose to use the
militias rather than go against them.
Although the expansion of paramilitary groups seems to guided by the acquisition of the
coca fields and cocaine routes, the military seems to have always supported the militias.
Indeed, as Ronderos (2014) points out, whether by ideological conviction or because they
were infiltrated by drug tra cking, the military pushed for the expansion of the self-defense
forces, and the executive did not prevent it, even when it might have been opposed. This
author presents us with a clear example of the military’s push for militias: in 1983, just as
the army’s fourteenth brigade was being set up, in a farm called La Paz near the municipality
of El Tecal the ‘school for the paramilitaries’ was created. This is reminiscent of Mazzei’s
(2009) argument, that paramilitary organizations in Latin America always operated in close
proximity to the regular forces despite their clandestine nature.
Indeed, throughout the 1980s the Colombian militias received constant training. Most
(in)famously, in 1988 they were trained by foreign mercenaries from the United Kingdom
and Israel (Grajales, 2017). Two mercenaries were of particular importance: Yair Klein4 and
David Tomkins, both of whom claimed to have been invited by Colombian authorities and
actually carried out the trainings without their own governments’ authorization. From them,
the paramilitaries learned counterinsurgency tactics that, closely related to the national
security doctrine and US counterinsurgent e↵orts in Central America, were aimed at ‘draining
the sea’ (Garzo´n, 2005; Rangel, 2005; Zelik, 2015). In fact, in between the trainings by the
Israelis, the massacre of Punta Coquitos took place (Ronderos, 2014).
The fact that some militias were constituted outside the existing legal framework was
symptomatic of both drug-tra cker’s mobilization of militias and of contradictions within
the government: in 1987, a great debate began within the executive, as the ministers of
Justice and Defense were pro self-defense forces, but peace advisors were opposed (Garzo´n,
2005). This contradiction would eventually lead to change the government’s stance towards
militias, as president Virgilio Barco would enact a decree (Decreto 815 of 1989) that would
modify the regulation of militias: civilians were no longer allowed to participate in o↵ensive
action against rebel groups, it forbade civilians to carry military-grade weaponry and also
forbade the army to provide civilians such weaponry (Ronderos, 2014).
However, this would not bar the security forces (nor the DEA, for that matter) from
4Upon apprehension in Russia in 2007 (Interpol had issued a warrant), he claimed that he was invited
by high-ranking o cers to train the paramilitaries.
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collaborating with a militia called Los Pepes (short for Persecuted by Pablo Escobar), an ag-
glomeration of paramilitaries and drug-tra ckers that hunted down the head of the Medell´ın
cartel. Los Pepes, Colombian and US authorities shared intelligence and coordinated their
manhunt e↵orts (Duncan, 2015). It would thus seem to be that, for Colombian and US
authorities, collusion with Los Pepes was acceptable because the main security threat was
Pablo Escobar. It takes a drug tra cker to catch another, never mind the risks.
Despite the fact that president Gaviria (1990-1994) opposed collaborating with Los Pepes,
he and his successor (Ernesto Samper, 1994-1998) enacted decrees (535 of 1993 and 356 of
1994) that allowed the establishment of private security cooperatives, later dubbed Convivir,
which received funding and arms from the government in order to supplement the army’s
activity. Colombia’s leaders, then, saw in militias. Many of the Convivir, however, were led
by leaders of already existing militias, that is, eminent drug-tra ckers (Ronderos, 2014).
This again shows just how risk-accepting the Colombian authorities were, as the expected
benefit of the Convivir trumped any concern regarding its member base overlapping that of
illegal militias, which in the end were drug-tra cking organizations. Now with the Convivir
the paramilitaries in Colombia had access to o cial resources and armament in addition to
what the trade of narcotics would give them. Then again, the risk for politicians and army
o cers was minimal, as the state had yet to punish collusion with militias.
With the growth of paramilitarism, both legal and illegal, a clear role specialization
began between the regular forces and the militias: of all human rights violations committed
in 1993, 55% were attributed to Colombia’s regular forces, whereas 18% were attributed to
the militias. By 1996 this was flipped: 60% of human rights violations were attributed to the
militias and only 10% to the armed forces (Zelik, 2015). Since the army continued to violate
human rights, it would seem to be the case that what was going on was not a delegation
of atrocities, but rather a division of labor based on the e↵ectiveness with which each force
would carry out di↵erent security tasks.
Yet another division within the government emerged in November of 1997, when the Con-
stitutional Court of Colombia modified the decree 356 of 1994 in order to make it compliant
with the new constitution. As a result, the Convivir were no longer allowed to use arms, and
so many of its members simply joined the ranks of the illegal militias already in operation
(Valencia, 2007).
The Rise and Fall of the AUC
The fact that in 1996 the army su↵ered their most devastating defeats against FARC paved
the way to the creation of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, the AUC Rangel
(2005), and the virtual dismantlement of the Convivir ’s ability to battle the insurgents
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provided both a bolstering of the AUC via the remobilization of the Convivir members
into the AUC and support of their state-abandonment discourse (see below). As was said
above, the AUC was a federation of militias led by the Castan˜o brothers. These brothers
were established drug tra ckers who were instrumental in the creation of Los Pepes and the
demise of Pablo Escobar (Duncan, 2015).
After the fall of the Medell´ın cartel, the Castan˜o brothers created the Peasant Self-Defense
Forces of Co´rdoba and Uraba´ (Autodefensas Campesinas de Co´rdoba y Uraba´) or ACCU.
Not only was the ACCU project supported by local and regional businessmen, as well as the
Colombian Armed Forces, it was also vastly funded by narcotics (Ronderos, 2014). If before
many militias were subordinated to the cartels, with the vacuum of power left by the demise
of the cartels it was now the militias who took control of the drug business (Echand´ıa, 2013).
Just as with Los Pepes, Colombia’s armed forces had seemingly no issue with coordinating
security production with drug tra ckers5. Indeed, since the government’s (and especially
the armed forces’) main concern was to eliminate the insurgency, then it made sense for
them to collude with militias, regardless of what the Colombian courts thought.
In this sense, letting the militias benefit from narcotics was the price to pay for their
operation and coordination with the army. Moreover, this could be viewed as the state
foregoing the benefits of taxing an economic activity6 because it would be such a great
liability to do so. This is especially true given Colombia’s dependence on the United States,
and the scandal that president Ernesto Samper had received drug money from the Cali cartel
for his presidential campaign was punished by the United States. Rather, the resources of
the ‘foregone tax’ go directly to the militias.
Moreover, the state actually paid a cost for tolerating the drug trade: a study done by
Colombian economist Miguel Urrutia (1990) shows the impact of drug tra cking on the
Colombian economy. Most profits from the drug trade enter Colombia (i.e, are laundered)
through contraband. This actually has a deindustrializing e↵ect, as contraband goods (which
are cheaper) compete with the national industry, lowering average prices. Indirectly, contra-
band damages fiscal revenues not only because these goods do not pay taxes but also because
deindustrialization means less companies paying less taxes. Not only that, drug tra ckers
also increased the demand for land and real estate7, making their price go up. Finally,
the income from the drug trade also increased inflation and revaluated the Colombian peso
5Although the vast majority of army commanders saw in the AUC natural allies (or at least tolerated
them) regardless of the costs, a few o cers took distance and even engaged them. The main example is the
now-retired General Rafael Colo´n Torres, who operated in the department of Sucre and became known for
his combats with the militias.
6A similar case could be made for extortion: letting the militias collect ‘taxes’ directly.
7Below I briefly show how the AUC was responsible for forced displacement and land dispossession.
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relative to the US dollar.
In April of 1997, three self-defense forces came together to create the AUC: the ACCU, the
Self-Defense Forces of the Magdalena Medio region and the Self-Defense Forces of the Llanos
Orientales region. At the moment of the creation of the AUC, the ACCU alone had 6,000
members (Romero, 2003) and a total of approximately 31,000 members had demobilized by
the end of 2006, after peace negotiations between the AUC and the government (Echand´ıa,
2013). It was clearly a sizable force.
The creation of the AUC was a political tactic by the paramilitaries to project a united
front and strive for legitimacy and political status. To this end, the AUC copied the rebels
in their organizational structure and their use of propaganda (Zelik, 2015): they showed
themselves as a necessary actor because of the weakness of the armed forces and the status
of defenselessness that it left the country’s periphery in.
Their discourse started to get more and more traction when the government of Andre´s
Pastrana (1998-2002) launched peace negotiations with FARC in 1998, as the rebel group
did not keep any ceasefire and continued to defeat the army throughout the periphery.
The successive defeats that the army su↵ered between 1998 and 1999 made Colombians
in and around the large cities fear an imminent encroachment by the rebels, which meant
that several sectors of society, especially those being extorted by the rebels, to support the
paramilitary project (Duncan, 2015).
Regardless of their discourse claiming abandonment, it was clear that the army and the
paramilitaries continued to collude. In fact, Zelik (2015) argues that both armed forces
benefited from each other’s activity at every turn: the AUC controlled areas supported by
the army through civilian killings and harassment (thus denying territories and supporters
to the rebels), and the state justified the modernization and expansion of its military not
only with the rebel threat but also with the mounting number of massacres committed by
the AUC.
The AUC financed itself mostly from drug tra cking and extortion, as was explained
above. However, they did receive resources from the Colombian government: money destined
to legal self-defense groups was diverted to the AUC and its predecessor groups. Not only
that, public funding found its way to the AUC through party candidates and alliances with
the local governments (Grajales, 2017).
International resources may have also found their way into the AUC. Dube and Naidu
(2015) argue that military aid resources from the United States, destined to bolster Colom-
bia’s military, found its way into the paramilitary organization. Indeed, they find that the
number of attacks by the AUC was greater near the army units that benefited from US
military aid than near those that did not. This fits well with our theory: if militias are
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already in use, then an increase in resources means an increase in the quantity allocated to
both forces.
The AUC spread quickly throughout Colombia and its activity became more and more
intense: they went from being present in 279 municipalities in 1997 to 455 in 2002, all the
while the number of civilian victims, especially from indiscriminate violence kept mounting
(Echand´ıa, 2013). Indeed, in the above-mentioned period Colombia experienced some of its
greatest massacres by the paramilitaries: according to the National Center for Historical
Memory of Colombia (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histo´rica, 2018), these were incursions
of the AUC into the rearguard of the rebel groups, during which a high level of terror attacks
and indiscriminate violence took place, and they were enabled by the regular forces, since
the AUC barely had any presence in the south of Colombia, where FARC were strongest.
In one of the most infamous massacres in the municipality of Mapiripa´n (in a FARC-
controlled region), army o cials allowed the AUC to land airplanes full of militiamen in
airports controlled by the armed forces and then provided them transportation to the future
massacre site8. Colombia’s security forces did nothing to intervene. Not only that, the Green
Berets actually provided training to the army brigade closest to Mapiripa´n both before and
after the massacre took place, which seems to indicate that US forces may have known of
the collusion and might have been tolerant of these counterinsurgency e↵orts (Zelik, 2015).
In fact, there seems to be evidence that the US was lax on Colombia despite accusations
of the army collaborating with the AUC. A 2001 report by Human Rights Watch shows
that US authorities were aware of the ties between the army and the paramilitaries, but this
didn’t stop the aid flow to Colombia: although US law prohibits the provision of military
aid to forces accused of human rights violations (the Leahy Provision), the US government
has been lax with its application, and president Clinton even signed a waiver that eliminated
the human rights conditionality that Congress pushed for when it came to aid for Colombia
(Human Rights Watch, 2001).
However, the Pastrana administration began to persecute the AUC and army o cers that
colluded with the militias. As Garzo´n (2005) explains, FARC leaders demanded president
Pastrana to put an end to paramilitarism in order to have a successful peace process. The
president thus prioritized going after the AUC and dismantle the Convivir once and for all.
Not only that, the president also ordered the removal of generals accused of having links
with the AUC and named a new commander general. The armed forces, however, saw this
as a concession to FARC and therefore the deployment of several brigades against AUC was
lacking9.
8See the report in https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/el-secreto-militares/70758-3.
9Note here that the regular forces can also become a liability by shirking responsibilities, as is modeled
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In addition, some sectors of society also started to break their ties to the AUC in 1999.
The motivation was two-fold: first, the 1999 economic crisis that shook Colombia (stemming
from the international crisis) made it so that some businesses and cattle-owners had to stop
supporting the AUC financially. Second, others were afraid of aligning with the AUC because
of their human rights records (Ronderos, 2014). The AUC had thus become a liability to
many sectors of society to continue supporting.
But they also became a liability to the state in two ways. First, the AUC expansion
was done with such speed and their reach into local and regional state institutions was such
that both the central government and the political and economic elites began to consider
the AUC as a threat to their own power and their position within the established social
order (Duncan, 2015). Indeed, right after their greatest expansion (2001), the so-called
‘July pact’ was signed between regional politicians and the AUC. Whether by coercion or by
financing, current and would-be mayors, governors and members of congress became allies or
subordinates of the AUC. With the AUC resources and voter intimidation at their disposal,
relatively newcomer politicians running as members of new political parties won enough seats
in the 2002 election that Colombia’s traditional parties lost their majority in congress, and
the share of parliamentarians with links to the AUC would only increase in the 2006 election
(Valencia, 2007).
Second, there was the matter of accountability: since the enactment of the new consti-
tution in 1991, transformations of the judicial system and governance institutions, paired
with greater international visibility and pressure from Colombia’s NGOs and activists, made
it so that the alliances between paramilitaries and the state would become too risky to be
maintained (in our model’s terms, both the salience of liability and its production by the
militias greatly increased). Indeed, the military were progressively losing their operational
autonomy thanks to both the growth of the paramilitaries (loss of the monopoly of internal
security) and the incursion of justice in politics, particularly the demand for more human
rights protection (Grajales, 2017). In fact, the Constitutional Court weakened the penal sta-
tus of the military: human rights violations were now considered to be a matter of ordinary
penal justice rather than the competence of military courts, which disabled the military’s
virtual immunity10.
Almost unexpectedly, the AUC and the newly installed government of A´lvaro Uribe
(2002-2006, 2006-2010) announced that they were negotiating a peace agreement in order to
demobilize and reintegrate the AUC into civilian life. Rangel (2005) argues that the AUC
wanted to demobilize because of war fatigue among the militia leaders11, the expectation
in our theory.
10This is reminiscent of the argument and tests put forth above in chapter 3
11Indeed, Carlos Castan˜o reportedly told one of his confidants that he had doubts about the prospect of a
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that the Uribe government would win the war, and that they would enjoy the same judicial
and political guarantees that the guerrilla groups that demobilized in 1991 had.
Secret negotiations began in November 2002 (barely months into Uribe’s term) and less
than a month later the AUC announced a unilateral ceasefire in order to start negotiations.
These started formally in July of 2003, along with demobilization, which would be concluded
in 2006. Coincidentally, US authorities were starting to ask for the extradition of the AUC
leadership for drug-tra cking in September of 200212. This is reminiscent of Pablo Escobar’s
negotiation with the government to turn himself in (the so-called sometimiento) and all his
e↵orts to put an end to extradition. Indeed, Carlos Castan˜o asked the US to suspend the
extradition orders as negotiations started13.
In this regard, the AUC’s incursion into politics, starting with the above-mentioned ‘July
pact’, was part of a strategy to transition into civilian life with as little punishment as possible
(Valencia, 2007), and so the AUC-influenced congress began to work on legislating the AUC’s
demobilization. In fact, this could also play out to the benefit of Colombian authorities and
army o cers, since avoiding truth commissions meant that collusion with the AUC would be
more di cult to prove. Demobilizing the AUC (i.e., stopping to use militias) was therefore
a way to minimize liability.
However, the legislation that would allow AUC members to demobilize with reduced
sentences and without having to testify in front of truth commissions was not accepted by
Colombia’s higher courts. The Constitutional Court modified the law, dubbed peace and
justice (Ley de Justicia y Paz), to safeguard victims’ rights and make truth commissions
mandatory, whereas the Supreme Court opposed granting AUC members the status of ‘po-
litical criminals’ and with the help of the Attorney General began investigating politicians
and army o cers accused of ties with the AUC (Grajales, 2013).
To make matters worse, in-fighting within the AUC, especially with regards to drug-
tra cking, made it so that in practice the government was negotiating with each bloc on
its own(Ronderos, 2014). Not only that, some AUC blocs refused to submit to the peace
process, but they were promptly confronted and eliminated by both the government and the
other AUC blocs. In this regard, the state had zero tolerance over dissidence in the AUC
and thus put pressure on militias so that all would demobilize (Garzo´n, 2005).
With the courts eliminating the transition to civilian life as the militias had tailored it,
military victory against FARC, that the best way forward for the AUC was to turn themselves in (Ronderos,
2014).
12“Estados Unidos pide extradicio´n de jefe paramilitar colombiano” www.eluniverso.com
/2002/09/24/0001/14/FCCA47E3D86540338FD34D96BB14497B.html.
13“Colombia: ‘Paras’ contra la extradicio´n”
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latinamerica/newsid3056000/3056652.stm
74
AUC leaders felt betrayed by the government and, in November of 2003, started to threaten
to tell all the truth and implicate many more politicians and army o cials. The government
moved them to high security prisons and, in May of 2008 suddenly extradited 6 of the top
AUC commanders to the US. This way, the six militia leaders were silenced and only paid
for drug-tra cking charges.
Despite the ongoing negotiations, collusion between the AUC and the army continued.
The launch of the Plan Patriota, Uribe’s military o↵ensive initiative to weaken the rebels,
paved the way for the AUC to continue its incursion in FARC-controlled territory, especially
in the south of the country, which also meant more control over coca plantations and even
intensified the dispossession of lands from civilians (Gutie´rrez San´ın and Vargas Reina, 2016),
much like it had happened in the north of the country.
Indeed, there is evidence that the AUC caused a big share of forced displacement in
Colombia: they were involved in protecting the lands of their allies while helping with land
grabs. Indeed, there has been massive displacement given indiscriminate violence in Colom-
bia’s counterinsurgency operations, and when locals resisted displacement by paramilitaries,
even by legal recourse, they were accused of supporting the guerrillas, which made them
targets of violence (Grajales, 2011, 2013).
Contrary to the conventional argument of the delegation of atrocities and plausible deni-
ability, the army also continued to violate human rights under certain circumstances. Most
infamous was the ‘false positives’ scandal, in which thousands of civilians were killed, either
by AUC or the army, and then presented as rebel group members downed in combat. This
followed from perverse incentives: the military were compensated for every rebel casualty
with more days o↵ and points for quicker promotions. As the AUC began demobilizing in
2003, the number of false positives began to rise substantively. The regular forces, now
devoid of the militias that navigated and kept the population in check by violating human
rights, had to look for new ways to show results (Pacho´n, 2009), and thus became a liability
for the government.
Not only that, when Uribe came to power he declared state of commotion in several
regions of Colombia and gave the security apparatus more leeway in their activity, which
meant more abuses from state forces and it was easier for the latter to produce more false
positives, as there was virtually no accountability in these sites. The Democratic Security
Policy, as Uribe’s main strategy was called, foresaw the retaking of territory from illegal
groups through the advancement of the army. Subsequently, the plan was the strengthening
of the judicial presence in the retaken municipalities in order to guarantee continued control.
The issue was the institutional vacuum in which the army operated, as the Democratic
Security Policy did not plan for a mechanism for the judiciary to keep the armed forces in
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check (Ca´rdenas and Villa, 2013).
4.2.2 Summing Up
The growth of the counterinsurgency and illegal militias that started in the 1980s, culmi-
nating in the founding of the AUC in 1997, thus meant a great risk to both civilians and
the state: not only did they commit atrocities, engage in drug tra cking and extortion,
they also took control of state institutions in the periphery (Duncan, 2014). Indeed, most
deaths from the Colombian conflict were civilians, and most of them were people accused of
sympathizing with or aiding guerrillas (Romero, 2003). Moreover, clashes between the AUC
and the regular forces occasionally took place, especially as negotiations between the AUC
and the government started.
The AUC, in sum, provided the state with some security against rebels in peripheral
areas. They defended local elites and communities that were harassed by FARC and ELN
while at the same time gathering intelligence to root out members and collaborators of these
groups. As has been shown above, not only was there a division of labor between regular
and irregular forces, there was also force substitution. In fact, the role specialization was
fueled by the substitution, as the army never stopped victimizing civilians, but did it more
in the absence of paramilitaries (Zelik, 2015; Pacho´n, 2009).
The price paid for this security gain (liability in our model), however, in terms of human
costs, increases in organized crime activity (especially drug tra cking) and deterioration of
democratic institutions, was very high (Mazzei, 2009; Centro Nacional de Memoria Histo´rica,
2018). Not only that, collusion with the AUC became extremely risky for both army o cers
and politicians, who in the end were not able to escape justice (Grajales, 2017; Valencia,
2007), even though it was tolerated for a very long time. Indeed, even the US government
kept on giving military aid despite overwhelming evidence that it was aiding brigades with
ties to the AUC to violate human rights (Human Rights Watch, 2001; Zelik, 2015).
The Colombian paramilitary experience thus provides us with an interesting case to test
our theory. They were a cheap but risky tool to bolster security and deny FARC and ELN
their advantage based on informational asymmetry. The Colombian government was thus
accepting of the risks of supporting the creation and growth of paramilitary groups in several
regions of the country. If we find patterns of substitution between the regular forces and the
AUC, then we will find evidence in favor of the theory herein.
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4.3 Research Design
I use the Universidad de los Andes’ Economic Development Study Center’s (CEDE) mu-
nicipal panel (Acevedo and Bornacelly, 2014) to analyze the Colombian case. This dataset
provides information on socioeconomic, governmental and conflict variables throughout the
period of interest. The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. Although the AUC were
active in the Colombian civil war between 1997 and 2006, the availability of other variables
limit the period under study to 2000-2006.
The dependent variable is the total number of o↵ensives that the Colombian armed forces
launched against the rebel groups active in the civil war, FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia) and ELN (National Liberation Army) in each municipality in each year. With
it, I aim to capture the amount of activity of the regular forces. Two reasons drive my
choice. First, using other types of regular force activity, such as defensive operations, would
rather be capturing the rebel groups’ activities. Second, and closely related, in the narrative
I showed that the AUC had a great deal of autonomy in their operations, and that the army
in many ways was simply an enabler of such activity. As such, because of the low (if any)
level of control over the AUC the army’s activity could be considered more as reactive to
what the AUC did.
The main independent variable is thus the number of attacks against the civilian popula-
tion by the AUC, which captures the amount of activity done by the militia. These attacks
range from homicides to kidnappings and armed incursions into populated areas. As was
discussed above, militias are usually active in defensive roles and keeping civilians in check
in order to deny safe havens, collaborators and new members to the rebels. The AUC’s
activity was mostly focused on rooting out civilians accused of collaborating with or being
sympathizers of FARC and ELN by any means. In other words, the AUC’s modus operandi
was ‘draining the sea’. Using AUC attacks against civilians, therefore, captures their main
activity in the production of security. As per hypothesis 4.1, I expect to find a negative
relation between AUC attacks and armed forces o↵ensives.
To control for conflict conditions I use the number of rebel attacks against the population
and the regular forces. This would give us both an identification of which are the regions
experiencing the conflict and its intensity. Herein, however, lies a di culty: conflict events
are rare, especially if the unit of observation is the municipality-year. This a↵ects both the
dependent variable and the three conflict variables described above. I follow Esarey and
Pierce’s (2012) strategy to deal with this issue. Since the change from having no events to
having at least one is qualitatively di↵erent than the change from one to two events, the
authors argue for the inclusion of a dummy variable that equals one when the count variable
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is greater than zero, and zero otherwise. I implement this for the AUC attacks variable and
both rebel attacks variables. The dummies would thus capture the impact of having AUC
or rebel activity, whatever it might be, in a municipality, and the original variables capture
the intensity of their activity.
To control for municipality characteristics I use the natural logarithm of municipal GDP
per capita in constant 1994 Colombian pesos14. Unfortunately, this variable is only available
starting the year 2000. In addition, I use the natural logarithm of both population and the
area (sq. Km.) of each municipality, as well as the natural logarithms of the distance (in
Km.) to the capital (Bogota´) and the regional capital.
I also include a dummy variable for the presence of coca plantations to account for the fact
that counternarcotics were an integral part of counterinsurgency, since rebel group revenue
originated mostly from cocaine15. Likewise, since the AUC started peace negotiations and
demobilization processes in 2003, I include a dummy to separate both periods of AUC activity
(before and during negotiations). The expectations is that after 2003 the army should be
more active as the AUC demobilized. Finally, I also use the lag of the dependent variable to
control for potential temporal dynamics, as a region that the regular forces target one year
is very likely to be targeted the next. Table 4.1 presents a summary of the variables.
The model of choice is the negative binomial. To test for robustness, I also use random
e↵ects to control for unit heterogeneity, and alternatively I use a zero-inflated negative
binomial regression since the dependent variable is zero in a great number of observations.
The regressors for the inflate equation are all variables save for AUC activity. A further
robustness check accounts for the potential issue of endogeneity between the dependent
variable and rebel activity. I use two-stage least squares regressions in which I use the lag
of the rebel activity variables as instruments for the current values.
As final controls I also use regional fixed e↵ects in order to tackle two issues: first, that
the AUC were not active in all regions, and second, that the dynamics of each region of
Colombia could have been di↵erent regarding counterinsurgency. After all, the AUC was
a federation of militias, and so each bloc could have had idiosyncratic behavior based on
who were leading them, and explains in-fighting and confrontation with the government. As
Gutie´rrez San´ın and Vargas Reina (2016) argue, paramilitarism in Colombia was localist
and regionalist by design, which means that there may some idiosyncratic behavior of each
14This variable I constructed using the CEDE panel’s data on GDP and the implicit price deflator cal-
culated by the national statistics department of Colombia, DANE, available in the Bank of the Republic
website: http://www.banrep.gov.co/pib-base-1994. I chose to use 1994 as the baseline for ease of calcula-
tions, given the available information
15Indeed, this was all the idea behind Plan Colombia, to bolster the military to eliminate drug tra cking,
thus indirectly hurting rebel finances
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DV: Reg. Forces O↵ensives 1.1048 3.1532 0 81
AUC Attacks vs. Civilians 0.2006 0.7737 0 20
Rebel Attacks vs. Civilians 0.6049 1.5972 0 32
Rebel O↵ensives 1.5015 4.2358 0 73
Ln GDP per capita 16.5013 0.7683 12.8728 19.8969
Ln Distance to Bogota´ 5.5468 0.7737 0 7.1482
Ln Distance to reg. capital 4.0880 0.9912 0 6.2027
Ln Area 5.8220 1.2819 2.7081 11.0925
Ln Population 9.5119 1.0937 5.3279 15.7536
Coca presence 0.1658 0.3719 0 1
component group of the AUC.
Second, the data available is about the activity of armed forces on either side of the war,
but not on presence nor control over sites. Thus, the fact that army activity in a region is
very low while AUC activity also is could be because one of the actors controls this region
so well that deployment here is not wont16.
4.4 Results
Tables 4.2 and4.3 present the regression results. Consistent with our hypothesis, the number
of AUC attacks against civilians is negatively related to the number of o↵ensives that the
Colombian armed forces launch against the rebel groups in a given municipality. This is
indicative of force substitution: the more active the AUC are in a municipality, the less active
the armed forces are in targeting rebels directly. This is despite a clear role di↵erentiation
between the forces.
At simple glance, one might say that these results are consistent with the conventional
wisdom that states delegate atrocities to militias because they can’t do them themselves.
However, the conventional wisdom is silent regarding how militia activity is related to how
the regular forces engage the rebels directly, which is what was tested here. Moreover, recall
from the narrative above that the Colombian army never stopped violating human rights,
16This is the case, for example, of the department of Co´rdoba in the north of Colombia, one of the
strongholds of the AUC.
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the demobilization of the AUC spiked the number of false positives, and declaring a state of
commotion in some regions gave the army such leeway that more violations were committed
without punishment.
We can also see that more o↵ensives are likely to be launched in larger municipalities
with greater GDP per capita that experience higher levels of rebel violence. These results
seem to be intuitive: a larger territory requires more operations to secure, and the greater
the value of a territory (measured by the per capita income) the more salient it becomes to
defend it (or take it back) from the rebels. Likewise, army operations are higher where there
is presence of coca plantations and after 2003. How far away the municipalities are from the
national and regional capitals and their population, however, are not significant across all
models.
As can be seen from all specifications, the results seem to be quite robust, except when
it comes to the zero-inflated models (although the p-values are less than 0.15). Endogeneity
issues between the levels of rebel and army activities do not seem to be a↵ecting the results,
as can be seen from models 5 and 6 in both tables. Moreover, accounting for temporal
dynamics (i.e., the former level of regular force activity) does not seem to undermine the
results either. Likewise, as is clear from table 4.3, accounting for both regional and municipal
characteristics and non-observables does not change the results.
To further explore the relation between AUC and armed forces activities, I use Stata’s
margins command based on model 1 from table 4.2 and plot the results. All dummy variables,
except negotiation, are set to 1, both rebel attacks vs. civilians and the armed forces are set
to 5 (typical values), and AUC attacks versus civilians varies from 1 to 20. I also di↵erentiate
the periods before and during negotiations with the AUC. The results are shown in figure
4.1.
As can be seen, when AUC activity increases from one to ten attacks, the expected
number of attacks by the regular forces decreases by approximately half. Municipalities
experiencing no AUC activity are expected to have an average of 2.1 o↵ensives by the regular
forces before negotiations with AUC started (that is, before 2003) and 3.51 o↵ensives during
negotiations. The expectation when there are ten AUC attacks, however, is 1.14 and 1.93
o↵ensives by the armed forces before and during negotiations, respectively.
Overall, it would seem to be that the substitution e↵ect of militia activity is relatively
small (roughly a 0.2 decrease in the expected value of regular force activity per unit increase
of AUC activity). This shouldn’t be surprising: as was said above, civil war events are
a rare phenomenon. Nevertheless,in relative terms it is quite significant, especially if we
consider larger changes in AUC activity: municipalities that experience no AUC attacks also
experience, on average, almost twice the number of regular forces o↵ensives against rebels
82
Figure 4.1: Expected Army O↵ensives Given AUC Attacks
than municipalities that experience ten AUC attacks against civilians.
4.4.1 Substitution or Division of Labor?
A critique that could be made to the results shown above is that what the regressions could
be capturing is simply the division of labor rather than force substitution, since it could just
be the case that AUC attacks against civilians happen in places where the army does not
launch o↵ensives against rebels and vice-versa. However, as can be seen in figure 4.2, there
is still quite the variation when the full sample is reduced to municipality years in which
both forces were active, and the relation found in the regression analysis above seems to be
holding.
To further address this, I run the models in table 4.2 using the reduced sample, that is,
only the municipality years that had both army and AUC activity. The results are shown in
table 4.4.
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Figure 4.2: AUC Activity and Armed Forces O↵ensives
As can be seen, the number of AUC attacks against civilians continues to be negatively
related to the number of o↵ensives by the armed forces. In most models, it is statistically
significant, and in models 5 and 6 they are barely not significant relative to the 0.1 level
(p-values of 0.109 and 0.115, respectively)17. These results are also robust to the inclusion
of the regional fixed e↵ects as was done for table 4.3, except for models 5 and 6, in which
the sign of the coe cient remains the same but loses significance.
In sum, the evidence shown here tells us that not only is there a division of roles between
the AUC and the army, there is also substitution among them: the more active the AUC is
in a municipality, the less active the regular forces are in the same. In this sense, although
both tools have a di↵erent immediate target (civilians or rebels), it seems to be the case that
they achieve the same ultimate goal, and so the state combines them.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has tested some of the implications of the economic theory of Pro-Government
Militias, namely that states regular and irregular forces are substitutable.
Using data from Colombia’s paramilitary experience during its most recent civil war,
I explored how the government combines both forces. Since each has advantages relative
to the other, then we should expect a distribution of e↵orts between the forces in which
the type of threat faced is met as e↵ectively as possible. Using militias to complement the
regular forces, however, necessarily means using less of the latter. In other words, not only
is there combination but also substitution of forces. I have found support for the proposed
hypothesis: the Colombian Armed Forces are more likely to launch a higher number of
17In fact, the p-values of models 1 and 4 are barely above the 0.05 level
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o↵ensives against rebel groups in regions where AUC activity is lowest, all else equal.
This chapter thus presents evidence that there is indeed force substitution at the local
level. It seem to be the case that role specialization plays an important role in engaging
in civil war, not only in terms of combining forces but also in terms of substituting them.
Indeed, the state is not only willing to accept the risk of a militia being active in its territory,
but that it reorganizes its tactics around this fact.
The study presented in this chapter has several implications. First, it points to a new
avenue of understanding civil war dynamics: that the deployment of state forces, both
regular and irregular, obeys a calculus of e ciency. Thus, to understand how the state
engages rebels we must account for how the state deploys its forces. Likewise, it also points
out to potentially determining how rebel tactics change, since the presence of militias may
make a region more prone to experiencing particular types of violence.
Second, it might be possible to use the level of activity of a state’s regular forces to
predict the presence and activity of militias, which is relevant for human rights protection.
This is especially important regarding informal militias: since the link they have with the
government is typically clandestine, then understanding variation in what the regular forces
do in comparable regions may allow us to evaluate the likelihood that an informal militia is
active there. Moreover, as we saw in the Colombian narrative, this goes for both their typical
activity (attacking rebels), as well as human rights violations: if an army has a history of
victimizing civilians, then changes in the patterns of such victimization may make it suspect
that they are collaborating with militias, especially if the overall number of human rights
violations remains largely constant or even increases.
Future research can focus on expanding these tests in two ways. First, the study could be
complemented with other case studies in order to ensure better generalizability and robust-
ness of the findings. Second, since in this particular study only a militia with an informal link
to the state was considered, future studies should explore civil wars in which o cial militias
are (also) present in order to assess whether they impact regular force activity di↵erently
than informal militias.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 What Have We Learned?
The goal of this study has been to explain under what circumstances states use militias. The
extant literature presents an explanation based on a principal-agent logic in which states use
militias to perform various security tasks, such as coup-proofing, population controls and
counterinsurgency. One of the main points of the literature is that states delegate human
rights violations in order to shift responsibility away from them, and thus militias are the
agents that do the state’s ‘dirty work’.
I have claimed that this view is problematic for several reasons, both theoretical and
empirical. First, it would seem to assume that the state always wants to violate human
rights, that is, there is an inherent benefit to violating human rights, regardless of context.
Yet, as we know from the repression-dissent literature coercion can backfire.
Second, it is not clear whether human rights violations stem from loss of agency or
from actual delegation. Yet, the works on militias do not specify how we may empirically
distinguish between both, and it might actually be impossible. Indeed, it seems like the
literature treats human rights violations as ‘fortunate’ agency loss. Moreover, some authors
seem to argue that agency loss happens at the recruit level rather than at the organizational
level, which then casts doubt on whether the state and the militia actually wanted the
members to abuse civilians or it is ordained by militia commanders contrary to the state’s
wishes.
Third, the principal-agent logic is not applied completely. At the heart of it is how
the principal sets up incentives so that the agent performs well (i.e., minimize shirking and
conflict of interests), and how it punishes an underperforming agent, given that success is
both a function of e↵ort and factors beyond the agent’s control. Assuming that human rights
violations are the task that is delegated, then what does it mean to perform well? Would
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the state punish a militia for victimizing too much, too little, or not at all?
This brings us to a first empirical problem: not all militias violate human rights, and
those that do usually do so in tandem with the government, as Jessica Stanton (2015)
points out. Thus, if the security forces also victimize civilians, then human rights violations
are not being delegated to militias. The task assigned to militias, then, must be specified
more generally and human rights violations treated di↵erently. I have argued that the task
delegated is security in general and human rights violations are a negative by-product of the
delegation, but it could happen through the use of either regular or irregular forces.
The second empirical problem is that plausible deniability does not seem to work: politi-
cians and army o cers are still punished for using or colluding with militias. At the very
least, this tells us that there is an inherent accountability risk in delegating atrocities that
cannot be escaped, and so the use of militias that violate human rights is either a decision
based on the likelihood of being caught or a cost that the state is willing to pay in exchange
for something else (security).
Finally, and returning to the first empirical problem, the current explanation for militias
does not take into account well enough that the decision of using militias is made in relation
to the regular forces already in use. Indeed, there is a trade-o↵ inherent to using irregular
forces to bolster the regular ones, but this is not addressed in the literature.
Taking these issues into consideration, this study has presented an alternative. I have
developed a consistent, general framework, which I dubbed The Economic Theory of Pro-
Government Militias, that analyzes under what circumstances do states use militias. Taking
policy substitutability as the starting point, I modeled the trade-o↵s that the government
faces when allocating its resources between its regular and irregular forces in order to face a
security threat, and the trade-o↵ between producing security and the risk that either force
will become a liability when used.
In brief, the theory argues that states optimize their resource allocation between its
available forces based on the cost-e↵ectiveness with which they produce security, both in
relation to each other and in relation to how risky it is to use each, as well as how much
the state values security relative to liability. In this sense, I have assumed nothing about
how each force produces security, only that some may be more dangerous to employ than
others, and human rights violations and being held accountable for them are a couple of
such dangers for the state.
The model allows understanding the substitution of forces and the trade-o↵ between
provision of security and risk inherent to the use of armed forces. It can be used to understand
who uses militias and where, as well as how their use impacts the use of the regular forces and,
therefore, the dynamics of conflict. What was achieved then was providing a more nuanced
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understanding of militia use based on the factors identified in the literature. In particular,
it is the first study to systematically combine both the advantages and disadvantages (risks)
of militias, both in and of themselves and in relation to the regular forces, in understanding
the state’s decision to use them, as other studies have usually focused on only one aspect at
a time.
Throughout chapters 3 and 4 I have performed empirical tests that have given favorable
evidence for the theory, both cross-nationally and subnationally. Chapter 3 presents cross-
national evidence that shows under which conditions states are more likely to use militias.
It focuses on domestic accountability in particular because the expectation of the economic
theory of pro-government militias is exactly the opposite of the expectation of the ‘plausible
deniability’ argument, which posits that the more accountable a state can be held the more
incentive it has to use militias.
I find that states that face a civil war are more likely to use militias, conditional on the
strength of their judiciary and how much control the state has over them. The conclusion is
that militias in general, but more autonomous ones in particular, are more likely to be used
when judicial independence is low. Militias under greater state control, however, are more
likely to be used regardless of judicial independence.
In this regard, it seems that states are sensitive to domestic accountability mechanisms,
even when it comes to using clandestine groups, as a strong judiciary can still hold leaders
responsible for the actions of militias. Thus, contrary to the ’delegation of atrocities’ argu-
ment in the literature, states do not use militias because they want the dirty job to be done
but rather because it is calculated that the state will be safer if it uses militias despite them
doing dirty work.
What the theory and the cross-national evidence imply in terms of policy is that domestic
accountability mechanisms are key in preventing clandestine militia actions and therefore
preventing human rights abuses. In this sense, the greater the accountability of the executive
the more it will prioritize having more control over security forces in order to minimize the
likelihood that they become a liability.
In addition, the theory has shown that international aid may actually be funding the use
of militias and therefore indirectly promoting the victimization of civilians in civil war set-
tings rather than empowering them. Since informal militias are such a common phenomenon
around the world, then it would be of great interest to the international community to en-
gage in measures that increase both domestic and international accountability in order to
discourage the use of militias that fight dirtily. Indeed, from the evidence presented here it
would seem that a significant investment in governance and, especially, judiciary systems as
part of the developmental aid would be most useful.
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Chapter 4, on the other hand, presents a case study of the United Self-Defense Forces
of Colombia (AUC), a militia active in Colombia’s most recent civil war. The goal of this
chapter was to assess the substitutability claim of the theory: given a fixed budget, by
allocating resources to one force the state will necessarily have less resources left to allocate
to the other one. What I thus analyze is policy substitutability.
To test this, I examined the statistical relation between the level of activity of the AUC
and the level of activity of the Colombian Armed Forces. Through this test I move beyond
the issue that resource allocation may not be observable. Rather than attempting to directly
test how states spend their budget, it is straightforward to assume that the more resources
spent on one force, the more activity we should expect from them. As such, the expectation
is that the level of activity of one force is negatively related to the other’s.
The subnational evidence shows how states combine forces and that there is indeed force
substitution: the higher the number of AUC attacks against civilians in a region, the fewer
the o↵ensives the Colombian Armed Forces launched against the rebels in the same. Force
substitution thus happens despite there being role specialization, as the Colombian case
showed. States thus not only adds militias to their armed forces but rather distribute them
following an optimization strategy that has substitutability at its core.
This opens up potential research regarding the micro-dynamics of civil war and how
the state uses both regular and irregular forces to face di↵erent types of domestic threats.
Indeed, the theory can be used to understand the specific circumstances under which militias
are deployed and used, both in terms of the characteristics of the civil war as well as the
regions they are active in and the state’s institutions therein.
Moreover, since there is a substitution e↵ect, then observing di↵erent levels of regular
force activity across comparable regions may allow us to predict militia activity, especially
when said militia has an obscure or clandestine link to the government. Indeed, the patterns
of human rights violations we observe may be indicative of force substitution, which would
therefore allow for suspecting the government’s role in civilian victimization and thus hold
it accountable.
This is, then, of interest to not only scholars of military operations and military and
state leaders, since the use of militias also impacts how the regular forces are used, but also
to human rights advocates and NGOs, since the theory points to ways to understand the
specific circumstances under which militias come to be used. In this sense, understanding
the calculus of the state about force deployment may allow communities to shield themselves
from irregular forces that could potentially be victimizers by finding ways of increasing the
liability to the state1.
1Communities may even be able to shield themselves from irregular forces’ actions themselves, as the
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5.2 Future Research
The theory developed in this study is intended as a general framework with which to under-
stand the circumstances under which a state would choose to use militias and how it combines
them with the regular forces. In chapter 2 I have briefly developed some implications of the
model and tested a couple in chapters 3 and 4.
I chose to test these particular implications for two reasons. first, the one in chapter
3 provided me with the opportunity to assess the merits of the theory relative to the con-
ventional wisdom, since the expectations following from them are at odds. The evidence
shown is consistent with my argument. Second, I chose to perform a case study in chapter
4 to show that the theory can be used to understand the phenomenon of militia activity
at di↵erent levels of aggregation. Chapter 4 showed that at the municipal level the logic of
force substitution put forth by the theory holds.
A coherent research program on militia use can be made based on this model. In this
section I explore avenues of research, both empirical and theoretic, that stem from this
dissertation.
5.2.1 Exploring the Theory’s Implications
The first step for future research is thus to explore more of the implications of the model.
Recall that the state’s decision depends on the amount of resources available, how the forces
compare to each other and the security-liability trade-o↵ of each, as well as how salient
security is relative to liability. These point to di↵erent venues of research. First, regarding
budgetary considerations, we could explore the impact of positive and negative shocks on
a country’s economy on the likelihood of using militias. Positive shocks, such as economic
growth or aid reception, whether developmental or military, may trigger the use of militias.
The study of foreign aid is of particular importance given the debate that this work has
started: since the literature regards aid dependence as an incentive to delegate atrocities
and my theory regards increases in budget as triggers to militia use, then future work should
find a way to better assess both. Moreover, militia use might be pushed by military aid
donors, as the resource flow could be designed to support the creation of militias as part of
a broader initiative. Negative economic shocks, on the other hand, might make states stop
using militias, or use ones that are cheaper but riskier. As the Colombian case shows, the
cost of using some militias can be indirect, such as tolerating their self-financing through
illegal means that the government may not be able to tax or that even damage the economy.
work of Oliver Kaplan (2013a,b) shows.
91
The theory also tells us that the decision to use militias and how much to spend on them
depends on how they fare in producing security relative to the regular forces. In this work
I have argued, in line with the literature, that militias hold an advantage relative to the
regular forces inasmuch they are flexible, adaptable, and may have better local information
that allows them to navigate the population and the geography easily. This can be made
more nuanced if we take into account, for example, the quality of the regular forces. The
stronger the army and the better trained it is in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism, for
example, the less the state may rely on militias.
Given the advantages of militias identified by the literature, then more theorizing could
be made regarding di↵erent types of threats the state faces. In civil wars in particular, the
type of rebellion faced might help explain why some states use militias while others don’t,
and what determines the timing of their use. For example, since guerrilla warfare abuses
informational asymmetry, then when rebels use hit-and-run tactics we should be more likely
to see militias deployed than when rebels wage a more conventional war.
Relatedly, deeper study of minorities within states is also warranted. In this study I have
used ethnic diversity in the most general way, but comparing ethnic and non-ethnic civil
wars would allow to assess whether states use militias of the same ethnic group as rebels to
drive a wedge between factions of the minority. This would be an interesting complement
to the work of Fanglu Sun (2016) on territorial autonomy and ethnic conflict: the state may
not only ‘buy out’ a faction of a minority with some degree of autonomy so that it only
wages war against the hardliners, it might even receive the aid of the friendly faction in the
armed confrontation.
Since rebel tactics may vary across time, the history of the conflict the state is engaged in
is also of interest. Based on the model, when security becomes more important than the risk
inherent to producing it, then we should see militias being used. Thus, both changes in how
rebels engage the state (see point above about tactics) and how successful they are could
make a state use militias in spite of a high risk of them becoming a liability. Moreover, as
the Colombian case above showed, the liability of using militias may also change over time.
As such, changes in domestic and international pressures for human rights protection,
for example, could tilt the balance away from militia use, especially those that would pose
a greater risk to civilians. Thus, we should also study how changes in accountability is
correlated with the timings of militia use and disuse. For example, signing human rights
treaties would not only increase the salience of liability, but also make it riskier for states
to use militias that it may not control well. In addition, changes in the state’s leadership
might actually change how salient the good are the bad are for the state, as the new leader
might assess a security situation di↵erently than the predecessor.
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5.2.2 Expanding the Theory
The theory presented here is based on a model that is relatively simple but has great traction,
since its logic can be easily applied to any case and, although the theory itself cannot be
tested directly, its implications are relatively straightforward to test, as the work above has
shown. Nevertheless, the theory can also be expanded in many ways.
First, I have assumed that the state has only two instruments to produce security. A
simple extension is to relax this assumption and disaggregate the types of forces used within
the regular and irregular categories. This might be especially beneficial in studying the
variance among militias that states use. Although the Pro-Government Militia Database
(Carey, Mitchell and Lowe, 2013) gives us general characteristics of the militias it identifies,
these have not been systematically used in the literature (some exceptions being Clayton
and Thomson, 2016; Carey and Mitchell, 2017), but rather only the type of link to the
government. As such, the theory would allow for distinguishing the e↵ectiveness of each
type of militia given the security concern to be addressed and how risky it is to use each
militia.
Second, I have assumed that the state is able to allocate any amount of resources into
either force, whereas in reality it might not be able to do exactly that. Rather, resource
allocation into any force may come in ‘chunks’. For example, one extra dollar invested into
the army would not be e↵ective at all. In this sense, it might be useful to redefine Ir and
Ii as units of forces used rather than money spent. By creating a cost function (that is,
assigning a cost to each unit of each force to be used) then we may be able to further explore
budgetary issues.
Third, the model posits that the state’s utility is given by the combination of forces, but
it assumes that it is simply a sum of e↵orts. In other words, the model supposes that the
production of security (and liability) of each force is independent of the other. Following
Wolford’s (2015) model of military coalitions, changing the model to account for how well
the e↵orts of the forces are combined may give us further insights on how states use their
forces. In this sense, depending on the characteristics of both regular and irregular forces,
it could be the case that the combination of forces is not simply the sum of its parts, but
rather they amplify or impede one another.
Finally, it must be noted that the theory presented here is decision-theoretic: I only study
how a state decides to optimally allocate its resources while assuming that other actors are
exogenous. To complement it, the theory could be expanded to also include the rebels’
decision-making in terms of which types of attacks they carry out (indeed, rebels also face
policy substitutability in their campaign). The same goes for the militias: deciding whether
to turn against the state or shirk their responsibilities is also a strategic decision.
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5.3 Policy Implications
The theory also leads us to several policy implications. Overall, the theory allows us to
understand not only how states structure their security forces, which means that it can tell
us not only how states make such structuring optimal but also how to constrain states into
providing security with as little liability as possible.
Through chapter 3 I have discussed the importance of domestic accountability in con-
straining the use of militias. The implication is that human rights advocacy would benefit
from pushing for stronger, independence court systems that make it costlier and riskier for
leaders to use unscrupulous agents.
Likewise, in chapter 4 I have argued and shown that there is indeed policy substitutability.
As such, patterns of civilians victimization by militias could be easily traced back to the
patterns of regular force deployment, and as such pressure governments to rein in their
militias or forsake their use altogether.
Using the theory we can also analyze how else it could be possible to minimize violence
against civilians by militias. Internationally, for example, aid donors could make a stronger
case for pushing for institutional development, especially when it comes to checks and bal-
ances, as either the goal of, or a condition for, aid flows. Likewise, the theory tells us that
states providing military aid should beware that they may be indirectly allowing the state
to use militias that would violate human rights, and as such should pay more attention to
how the recipient uses said aid, as the case of Colombia illustrates (see chapter 4 and Human
Rights Watch, 2001).
On the other hand, the theory also tells us that, depending on the circumstances, using
militias to enhance security could be more cost-e↵ective than simply expanding the regular
forces. This is in a way reminiscent of Ahram’s (2011) discussion of state-building through
the use of militias inasmuch achieving the Weberian ideal of the monopoly of violence may
be unfeasible, at least initially. What the theory tells us is that militias can be (and usually
are) part of a state’s optimal strategy in producing security. Moreover, this need not put
civilians in risk: militias can be set up in such a way that human rights are respected and
communities protected.
In this sense, we again turn to implications for the international community: securing
areas in weak states or post-conflict scenarios could plausibly be done by mobilizing local
communities into o cial, controllable militias. For example, the US collaborated with the so-
called Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to fight against the Taliban and secure the northern
territories and populations. Again, the greatest issue would be how to set up militias in such
a way that they do not become a liability for the state nor a danger to the civilians they are
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supposed to protect.
International and domestic actors can also make the use of unscrupulous militias less
likely not only by making it costlier (i.e., an increase in liability), but also by making the
issue more important (i.e., increasing the relative salience of liability over security). The
more attention is paid to human rights, for example, through better reporting and whistle-
blowing, the more likely a state will show restrain and demand it from its agents. This is
particularly important for peaceful dissident movements: knowing how much their adversary
(i.e., the state) could be held accountable for using militias, even in secrecy, will better inform
dissidents on the risks they face and how to ameliorate the situations so that protests and
demonstrations go forth with minimal or no loss of life.
Along the same lines, the theory is also informative for conflict management e↵orts. As
security becomes less important to a regime, the less likely it is to produce security at any
cost. As such, if international intervention backs a regime into a corner, then the leader is
going to fight to the bitter end. Recall the case of Yugoslavia: ethnic cleansing and massacres
increased after the international community committed to the conflict.
This also applies to the rebel side. As was said above, this model could also be applied
to rebel organizations in understanding the tools they use during conflict. As such, and in
line with Jessica Stanton’s (2016) work, making human rights more salient for them and
violations costlier, domestic and international actors could minimize non-combatant losses.
Along these lines, the work of Hyeran Jo (2015) about rebel commitment to human rights
treaties is informative: giving rebel organizations more opportunities to credibly commit
to restraint would make their use of tactics that target civilians more costly, as now the
international community may also hold them accountable.
Moreover, domestic audiences may also work to influence the portfolio of actions rebels
have available. Again, the work of Oliver Kaplan (2013a,b) is informative: international law
may empower local communities to engage with violent organizations and demand restraint.
Likewise, the work of Ana Arjona (2016) on how communities resist being (completely) ruled
by non-state actors is also informative: the quality of local institutions can make citizens
engage armed actors in such a way that war-time order may be as peaceful as possible. Seen
from our theory’s perspective, each community has the ability to make liability greater and
more salience to the armed actors, and as such change the calculus on security provision.
Bibliography
Acevedo, Karina and Ivan Bornacelly. 2014. “Panel Municipal CEDE.” Documentos CEDE
26:1–23.
Ahram, Ariel I. 2011. “Learning to Live with Militias: Toward a Critical Policy on State
Frailty.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 5(2):175–192.
Arjona, Ana. 2016. Rebelocracy: Social Order in the Colombian Civil War. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Ash, Konstantin. 2016. “Threats to Leaders’ Political Survival and Pro-Government Militia
Formation.” International Interactions 42(5):703–728.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2016.1138108
Banks, Arthur S. 2008. “Cross-national Time-series Data Archive User’s Manual.”.
URL: http://www.databanksinternational.com/71.html
Biberman, Yelena. 2018. “Self-Defense Militias, Death Squads, and State Outsourcing of
Violence in India and Turkey.” Journal of Strategic Studies 41(5):751–781.
URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2016.1202822
Bo¨hmelt, Tobias and Govinda Clayton. 2018. “Auxiliary Force Structure.” Comparative
Political Studies 51(2):197–237.
URL: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414017699204
Ca´rdenas, Ernesto and Edgar Villa. 2013. “La pol´ıtica de seguridad democra´tica y las
ejecuciones extrajudiciales.” Ensayos Sobre Pol´ıtica Econo´mica 31(71):64–72.
Carey, Sabine C., Michael P. Colaresi and Neil J. Mitchell. 2015. “Governments, Informal
Links to Militias, and Accountability.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(5):850–876.
Carey, Sabine C., Michael P. Colaresi and Neil J. Mitchell. 2016. “Risk Mitigation, Regime
Security, and Militias: Beyond Coup-proofing.” International Studies Quarterly 60(1):59–
95
96
72.
URL: https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-lookup/doi/10.1111/isqu.12210
Carey, Sabine C. and Neil J. Mitchell. 2016. Pro-Government Militias and Conflict. In
Oxford Research Encyclopedia. Vol. 1 Oxford University Press pp. 1–26.
URL: http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228637-e-33
Carey, Sabine C. and Neil J. Mitchell. 2017. “Progovernment Militias.” Annual Review of
Political Science 20(9):127–147.
URL: https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051915-045433
Carey, Sabine C., Neil J. Mitchell and Will Lowe. 2013. “States, the security sector, and
the monopoly of violence: A new database on pro-government militias.” Journal of Peace
Research 50(2):249–258.
URL: http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0022343312464881
Centro Nacional de Memoria Histo´rica. 2018. Paramilitarismo: Balance de la Contribucio´n
del CNMH al esclarecimiento histo´rico. Bogota´: Centro Nacional de Memoria Histo´rica.
Choi, Hyun Jin and Clionadh Raleigh. 2015. “Dominant Forms of Conflict in Changing
Political Systems.” International Studies Quarterly 59(1):158–171.
Clayton, Govinda and Andrew Thomson. 2016. “Civilianizing civil conflict: Civilian defense
militias and the logic of violence in intrastate conflict.” International Studies Quarterly
60(3):499–510.
Cohen, Dara Kay and Ragnhild Nord˚as. 2015. “Do States Delegate Shameful Violence to
Militias? Patterns of Sexual Violence in Recent Armed Conflicts.” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 59(5):877–898.
Davenport, Christian. 2007. “State Repression and Political Order.” Annual Review of
Political Science 10(1):1–23.
URL: http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.143216
De Bruin, Erica. 2018. “Preventing Coups d’e´tat.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62(7):1433–
1458.
URL: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002717692652
Dube, Oeindrila and Suresh Naidu. 2015. “Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The E↵ect of U . S
. Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia.” The Journal of Politics 77(1):1–30.
97
Duncan, Gustavo. 2014. Ma´s que plata o plomo: El poder pol´ıtico del narcotra´fico en Colom-
bia y Me´xico. Bogota´: Debate.
Duncan, Gustavo. 2015. Los Sen˜ores de la Guerra. Bogota: Debate.
Echand´ıa, Camilo. 2013. “Narcotrafico: Genesis de los paramilitares y herencia de bandas
criminales.” Informes FIP 19.
Eck, Kristine. 2015. “Repression by Proxy: How Military Purges and Insurgency Impact the
Delegation of Coercion.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(5):924–946.
URL: http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0022002715576746
Epperly, Brad and Jacqueline Sievert. 2018. “Conflict and Courts: Civil War and
Judicial Independence across Democracies.” Political Research Quarterly (forthcom-
ing):106591291880320.
URL: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1065912918803200
Esarey, Justin and Andrew Pierce. 2012. “Assesing Fit Quality and Testing for Misspecifi-
cation in Binary-Dependent Variable Models.” Political Analysis 20(4):480–500.
Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity , Insurgency , and Civil War.”
American Political Science Review 97(1):75–90.
Garzo´n, Juan Carlos. 2005. La complejidad paramilitar: una aproximacio´n estrate´gica. In
El poder paramilitar, ed. Alfredo Rangel. Bogota´: Editorial Planeta pp. 47–136.
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and H˚avard
Strand. 2002. “Armed Conflict 19462001: A New Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research
39(5):615–637.
Gonza´lez, Ferna´n E. 2014. Poder y Violencia en Colombia. Bogota´: Odecofi-Cinep.
Grajales, Jacobo. 2011. “The rifle and the title: paramilitary violence, land grab and land
control in Colombia.” Journal of Peasant Studies 38(4):771–792.
URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03066150.2011.607701%5Cnhttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03066150.2011.607701
Grajales, Jacobo. 2013. “State Involvement, Land Grabbing and Counter-Insurgency in
Colombia.” Development and Change 44(2):211–232.
Grajales, Jacobo. 2017. Gobernar en medio de la violencia: Estado y paramilitarismo en
Colombia. Bogota: Editorial Univesidad del Rosario.
98
Gutie´rrez San´ın, Francisco and Jenni↵er Vargas Reina. 2016. Introduccio´n. In El despojo
paramilitar y su variacio´n: quie´nes, co´mo, por que´, ed. Francisco Gutie´rrez San´ın and
Jenni↵er Vargas Reina. Bogota´: Editorial Univesidad del Rosario pp. 1–40.
Hathaway, Oona A. 2007. “Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?” Journal
of Conflict Resolution 51(4):588–621.
URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27638567 http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002707303046
Human Rights Watch. 2001. The ”Sixth Division”: Military-Paramilitary Ties and U.S.
Policy in Colombia. Technical report.
URL: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/colombia/6theng.pdf
Jentzsch, Corinna. 2014. Militias and the dynamics of civil war Phd Yale.
Jentzsch, Corinna, Stathis N. Kalyvas and Livia Isabella Schubiger. 2015. “Militias in civil
wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(5):755–769.
URL: http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0022002715576753
Jo, Hyeran. 2015. Compliant Rebels: Rebel Groups and International Law in World Politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. and Ana Arjona. 2005. Paramilitarismo: una perspectiva teorica. In El
poder paramilitar, ed. Alfredo Rangel. Bogota´: Editorial Planeta pp. 25–46.
Kaplan, Oliver. 2013a. “Nudging Armed Groups: How Civilians Transmit Norms of Protec-
tion.” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 2(3):62.
URL: http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.cw/
Kaplan, Oliver. 2013b. “Protecting civilians in civil war: The institution of the ATCC in
Colombia.” Journal of Peace Research 50(3):351–367.
Koren, Ore. 2017. “Means to an end: Pro-government militias as a predictive indicator of
strategic mass killing.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 34(5):461–484.
URL: http://cmp.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0738894215600385
Lessing, Benjamin. 2017. Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and Cartels in Latin
America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
99
Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. Causes of War. Malden-Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell.
Linzer, Drew A. and Je↵rey K. Staton. 2015. “A Global Measure of Judicial Independence,
1948-2012.” Journal of Law and Courts 3(2):223–256.
URL: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/682150
Lyall, Jason. 2010. “Are coethnics more e↵ective counterinsurgents? evidence from the
second chechen war.” American Political Science Review 104(1):1–20.
Marshall, Monty G., Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr. 2010. “The Polity IV Project.”.
URL: www.systemicpeace.org/polity/ polity4.htm.
Mazzei, Julie. 2009. Death squads or self-defense forces? How paramilitary groups emerge
and challenge democracy in Latin America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press.
Mitchell, Neil J., Sabine C. Carey and Christopher K. Butler. 2014. “The Impact of Pro-
Government Militias on Human Rights Violations.” International Interactions 40(5):812–
36.
Most, Benjamin A. and Harvey Starr. 1984. “International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy
Substitutability, and ”Nice” Laws.” World Politics 36(3):383–406.
Otto, Sabine. 2015. The Grass Is Always Greener ? Armed Groups’ Side Switching in Civil
Conflicts PhD thesis Universita¨t Konstanz.
Otto, Sabine. 2018. “The Grass Is Always Greener? Armed Group Side Switching in Civil
Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62(7):1459–1488.
URL: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002717693047
Pacho´n, Mo´nica. 2009. “Colombia 2008: e´xitos, peligros y desaciertos de la seguridad
democra´tica de la administracio´n Uribe.” Revista de Ciencia Pol´ıtica 29(2):327–353.
Palmer, Glenn and T. Clifton Morgan. 2006. A Theory of Foreign Policy. Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press.
Raleigh, Clionadh. 2016. “Pragmatic and Promiscuous.” Journal of Conflict Resolution
60(2):283–310.
URL: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002714540472
100
Raleigh, Clionadh and Hyun Jin Choi. 2017. “Conflict Dynamics and Feedback: Explain-
ing Change in Violence against Civilians within Conflicts.” International Interactions
43(5):848–878.
URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2017.1235271
Rangel, Alfredo. 2005. Ado´nde van los paramilitares? In El poder paramilitar, ed. Alfredo
Rangel. Bogota´: Editorial Planeta pp. 11–24.
Romero, Mauricio. 2003. Paramilitares y autodefensas 1982-2003. Bogota: Planeta.
Ronderos, Mar´ıa Teresa. 2014. Guerras recicladas. Bogota´: Aguilar.
Simmons, Beth A. 2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic
Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Staniland, Paul. 2015. “Militias, Ideology, and the State.” Journal of Conflict Resolution
59(5):770–793.
Stanton, Jessica A. 2015. “Regulating Militias: Governments, Militias, and Civilian Target-
ing in Civil War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(5):899–923.
Stanton, Jessica A. 2016. Violence and Restraint in Civil War: Civilian Targeting in the
Shadow of International Law. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sudduth, Jun Koga. 2017. “Coup risk, coup-proofing and leader survival.” Journal of Peace
Research 54(1):3–15.
URL: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343316676885
Sun, Fanglu. 2016. Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Ethnic Rebellion PhD thesis Rice
University.
Urrutia, Miguel. 1990. “Ana´lisis costo-beneficio del tra´fico de drogas para la economı´a
colombiana.” Coyuntura Econo´mica 20(3):115–126.
URL: http://www.repository.fedesarrollo.org.co/handle/11445/2365
Valencia, Leo´n. 2007. Los caminos de la alianza entre los paramilitares y los pol´ıticos. In
Parapol´ıtica: la ruta de la expansio´n paramilitar y los acuerdos pol´ıticos, ed. Mauricio
Romero. Bogota´: Corporacio´n Nuevo Arcoiris pp. 11–58.
Wolford, Scott. 2015. The Politics of Military Coalitions. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
101
Zelik, Raul. 2015. Paramilitarismo: Violencia y transformacio´n social, pol´ıtica y econo´mica
en Colombia. Bogota´: Siglo del Hombre Editores, Fescol, Goethe Institut.
